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Tales of Conflict, Politics of Division
In July 2000,1 traveled on a crowded bus south from Central Sulawesi's Muslim- 
majority capital, Palu, to the Protestant-majority highlands. Protestant and Muslim 
passengers around me, previously strangers, chatted about the reprehensibility of the 
violence occurring just two hundred kilometers east in Poso. A Muslim elder on the bus 
concluded the conversation by saying, "In Palu people eat fish, but in Poso fish eat 
people" ("Di Palu orang makan ikan tapi di Poso ikan makan orang"). Afterwards, my 
Protestant companions discussed the phrase. In Palu, things were still good, with 
people eating the best of all foods, fish. In Poso, things were reversed and unnatural: 
the corpses of victims had been tossed in the river, their fate to be a meal for fish. It 
was said that fisherman, while gutting fish from the Gulf of Tomini, north of Poso, had 
discovered severed hands wearing golden rings.
1 1 am grateful to many who shared data related to Poso, including Greg Acciaioli, Timothy Babcock, Jafar 
Bua, Betty Chandra, Elizabeth Coville, Clark Cunningham, Kevin Evans, Sundjaya, Sidney Jones, Celia 
Lowe, John MacDougall, Michael Martens, Andrea Molnar, Oren Murphy, Rusli Pasau, David Rohde, 
Albert Schrauwers, and Esther Veldhoen. I am further indebted to Greg Acciaioli, Robert Hefner, Sidney 
Jones, David Rohde, and Albert Schrauwers for comments on an early draft, and to Ben Anderson and 
Deborah Homsher for extensive substantive and editorial suggestions. I also thank conflict symposium 
colleagues, including Gene Ammarell, Jacques Bertrand, Elizabeth Collins, Robert Hefner, Octovianus 
Mote, Nancy Peluso, Imam Prasodjo, and Danilyn Rutherford.
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Communal violence between Muslims and Protestants began in the eastern Central 
Sulawesi town of Poso during late December 1998 (Phase One) and recurred in April 
2000 (Phase Two). The fighting escalated to civil war conditions throughout the 
regency (kabupaten) in May 2000 (Phase Three). Beginning in April and continuing to 
the present (August 2001), arson, vehicle, and neighborhood attacks, as well as 
masked murders, have rebounded (Phase Four). By the end of what is known as Phase 
Three (May-July 2000), hundreds of people were seriously injured, from three hundred 
to eight hundred were killed, and nearly 150 corpses had been burned, decapitated, 
and dumped into the Poso River or other mass graves. At least 3,500 houses, two 
schools, and nine places of worship were destroyed in twenty towns. More than 
seventy thousand persons fled their homes. By July 2000, Poso was virtually empty, 
referred to as a dead city (kota mati).
The animosity between certain Protestant and Muslim groups in Poso took its 
particularly violent form under shifting state and military policies. Regency-level 
political struggles developed in an atmosphere charged with legal turpitude, weak 
journalism, and incitement by some religious leaders on both sides. As conditions 
worsened, segments of Poso's Muslim and Protestant communities began to respond to 
any perceived assault with a pattern of multiplied revenge; not tit for tat, not just 
explosive anger, but the idea that an extra wallop or calculated punishment was 
required in the vindictive act. "Our cousin was knifed, so we bum your town. You 
burned our houses, so we ambush hundreds from your community, kill them, and cut 
them into pieces." This increasingly calculated retribution pattern gradually became 
portrayed and justified in vaguely scriptural terms.
Why did such violence between religious communities in Poso suddenly surge only 
months after the resignation of President Suharto in May 1998? Why did the violence 
recur and escalate over a period of nearly three years (thus far), remaining unchecked 
by local and national authorities? And why were Protestants and Muslims who lived 
only a half day's drive away in western Central Sulawesi still able to remain friendly 
and communicative, albeit apprehensive, despite the nearby conflicts and a mounting 
burden of Poso refugees?
Somehow religion interacted with Poso Regency's economic and political structure 
in a destructive way linked to Indonesia's broader national and international 
problems. It bears noting, however, that this fight is not about religious doctrines or 
practices, but about the political economy of being Protestant (or Catholic) and 
Muslim. Answers to the three questions above reside in the congruence of peculiar 
Indonesian state conditions and Poso Regency's competing "religious" collectivities, 
which are based historically on certain types of land and human allegiance claims. 
Below I first discuss state issues, regional religious history, legal and demographic 
shifts, and Poso's 1998-1999 regent competition. Then I detail the conflict phases, 
explore religious rationales, and finally begin to analyze patron-client links that mark a 
geographic path from the initial urban to the ensuing rural violence. Although the 
analysis begins with the inextricable context of the state, the intent of this essay is to 
redirect consideration of Indonesia's political reformation problems so that more 
attention is focused on the state's interaction with grassroots conditions of outer 
island regions. It is there where many comparable battles between Indonesia's
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"indigenous" or homeland communities and the migrant or diaspora communities are 
being fought.
Contemporary State Problems and Ethnonationalist Conflicts
The 1997 Asian financial crisis had an especially deep impact on Indonesia 
because of the country's grossly mismanaged banking industry, which worked with the 
corrupt and nepotistic monopolies set up by the Suharto regime.2 Recognition of the 
Suharto family's role in the economic crisis, along with increasing popular pressure for 
democratic reforms, led to Suharto's ouster in May 1998. In the following months of 
former Vice-president B. J. Habibie's presidency, riots characterized as ethnic or 
religious attacks occurred in Waikabubak, West Sumba; Ketapang, Jakarta; Kupang, 
West Timor; Makassar, South Sulawesi; and Banyuwangi, East Java; these are just a 
few of the clashes that immediately preceded Poso's. The December 1998 rioting in 
Poso, in turn, was overshadowed by even greater violence in Ambon, Maluku that 
began two weeks later.
During roughly the same time period, Jakarta responded to popular demands for 
regional autonomy with regional redistricting and laws portending to shift far more 
control over funds from national and even provincial levels to the regency (kabupaten) 
level.3 As a result of this political transformation, competitions for regency 
administrative posts now involved higher stakes, and election campaigns became open 
grounds for communal mobilization in several areas, including Poso.4 That the Poso 
election struggles ultimately coalesced around religious (Protestant, or even Christian, 
versus Muslim) rather than merely ethnic (Pamona versus Bugis and Javanese) factions, 
widened the scale of the conflict and signifies the power of twentieth-century 
transnational influences on the outer islands' economic and religious constellations.
The rapid succession of violent communal conflicts just before and after Suharto's 
resignation variously suggested top-down models of broad-based conspiracies, or 
bottom-up models of flawed democratization. According to such models, outbursts of 
violence in Indonesia either are engineered by national elites stirring up trouble that will 
require suppression by an authoritarian state, or the outbursts are viewed as the result 
of liberating democratic reforms (Reformasi) gone awry, descending into lawlessness. In 
these basic forms, neither model addresses the accumulated resentments and subtle 
realignments of ethnic, religious, and economic consciousness that have developed over
2 See Shalendra D. Sharma, "The Indonesian Financial Crisis: From Banking Crisis to Financial Sector 
Reforms, 1997-2000," Indonesia 71 (April 2001): 79-110; also, Mark McGillivray and Oliver Morrissey, 
"Economic and Financial Meltdown in Indonesia: Prospects for Sustained and Equitable Economic and 
Social Recovery," in Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia, ed. Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley, and 
Damien Kingsbury (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1999), pp. 3-26.
3 These are the 1999 Regional Autonomy Laws (No. 22,25,28) passed during Habibie's one-and-a-half 
year term. See Undang-Undang Otonomi Daerah 1999 (Bandung: Kuraiko Pratama, 1999).
4 On regency election wrangling in Sumba, Central Kalimantan, and Maluku respectively, see Jacqueline 
Vel, "Tribal Battle in a Remote Island: How District Leaders in Sumba (Eastern Indonesia) Combat the 
Fading of Their Authority," in this issue; Human Rights Watch, "Indonesia: The Violence in Central 
Kalimantan (Borneo)," February 28, 2001; Gerry van Klinken, "The Maluku Wars: Bringing Society Back 
In," Indonesia 71 (April 2001): 1-26, esp. 21.
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long periods of time in numerous Indonesian provinces. They also miss the way that 
precolonial communal ties to land, indigenous hierarchies, and religious separatism in 
the twentieth century have interacted with contemporary squabbles among elites and 
their followers for regional power, a scramble fomented by the economic and civic 
institutional weakness of the post-Suharto state. Finally, these models do not fully 
appreciate the critical interaction between a fluctuating or otiose state, inclined to 
solutions based in force, and the opportunistic factionalism that has risen in the 
statelets of the regional administrations.5
Dysfunctional postcolonial states as far a way as South Asia and sub-Saharan 
Africa evidence contemporary patterns of ethnoreligious violence that bear more than a 
passing resemblance to Indonesia's recent disruptions.6 In the case of post-Suharto 
conflict areas such as Central Sulawesi, Maluku, and Kalimantan, recurring structural 
features include: a history of coastal Muslim kingdoms and Protestant missionization 
of the interior; New Order (trans)migrant versus indigene economic tensions; the 
presence of jobless or underemployed youth; heightened provincial and regency battles 
over elections or redistricting issues; teenage brawls on religious holidays; both 
rumored and actual attacks on houses of worship; partisan or weakly documented 
media reports; ineffective or inappropriately involved security troops; and extensive 
property vandalism, arson, and organized (often masked) murder campaigns. Both the 
preexisting social conditions and the conflict features follow these repeating patterns.
Many observers of the Poso case, within and beyond Indonesia, thus have 
suspected the handiwork of political provocateurs, at the national, or even 
international level. In several other Indonesian cases, abundant evidence exists that 
paid henchmen (preman) planted rumors or committed criminal acts to incite 
communal fear and revenge.7 In Poso, it appears that certain district politicians helped 
incite violence and, as conflicts unfolded, some provincial religious leaders supported 
the attackers. Moreover, one of the three Christians tried and convicted for Muslim 
butchery in Poso's Third Phase was an immigrant ex-convict of likely preman status. 
Yet despite the myriad rumors and media allegations, there is no firm evidence for 
active involvement from Jakarta. As Gerry van Klinken notes well for the Maluku case, 
the central state's role was more likely characterized by impotence, or was at best a 
matter of periodic and opportunistic collusion, rather than strategic planning and 
investment.8 Indonesia's army and police forces were undergoing major crises and
5 A good case study of these interactive processes is Geoffrey Robinson, The Dark Side of Paradise: Political 
Violence in Bali (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).
6 Van Klinken's lucid analysis of the Maluku conflicts proposes global comparisons with Africa's failed 
states; van Klinken, "The Maluku Wars." On recurring features of postcolonial conflicts, see Stanley J. 
Tambiah, Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1996).
7 Joshua Barker, "State of Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Suharto's New Order," Indonesia 66 
(October 1998): 7-42; Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000); Loren Ryter, "Pemuda Pancasila: The Last Loyalist Free Men of 
Suharto's Order?," Indonesia 66 (October 1998): 45-73; James T. Siegel, A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: 
Counter-revolution Today (Chapel Hill: Duke University Press, 1998).
8 Van Klinken, "The Maluku Wars," pp. 7-10.
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restructuring during this period.9 And in Poso, like Maluku, there were numerous 
eyewitness reports of non-neutral participation by, and tensions between, the army 
and police divisions. Therefore, in the current absence of evidence of direct state 
mischief, I argue that the state's clearest role in the Poso conflicts concerns how its 
shifting and irresponsible policies fomented the destructive factionalism of regional 
elites and their client groups.
Additionally, Poso's political problems, like those of Maluku and Kalimantan, 
were exacerbated by inflammatory mass media reports, which led Indonesians in other 
areas to see distant local disputes as pan-Indonesian religious or ethnic crises.10 The 
city of Poso had no local newspapers or television stations, so almost all reporting 
was conducted by outside journalists, the nearest originating in Palu. Many of the 
reporters assigned to the conflict were unwilling or unable to enter the war-tom area, 
and the resulting journalism was minimal or one-sided at best.11 Most insidious for 
local readers and frustrating for scholars were the continuing brief reports of violent 
events that only hinted at the personal, religious, or geographic identities of "culprits" 
and "victims" in a simultaneously vague and incendiary fashion. Such reporting left 
readers with virtually no solid data about the conflicts' early chronology or causes, 
while tacitly encouraging Indonesian readers to view themselves as potential or actual 
victims of generally unnamed religious enemies.
Colonial and Regional Religious History
Poso, like the provincial capital of Palu, is an old coastal port that links sea trade 
via riverine routes—and now roads—to the agricultural valleys and daunting mountain 
ranges that blanket interior Sulawesi. Muslim traders, often Bugis and Arabs, 
frequented and settled in such ports prior to the Dutch colonial domination of the 
region that began in the late 1800s. Seafaring Muslims influenced and married 
indigenous, coastal people, most of whom eventually adopted Islam. By contrast, the 
scores of small interior populations, which vary gradually by language and cultural 
practices in a mosaic pattern, generally remained apart from state formations and did 
not convert to Islam or any other world religion prior to Dutch penetration.12 These 
highlanders, who subsisted by shifting cultivation of rice, tree crops, and tubers, thus
9 The Editors, "Changes in the Civil-Military Relations Since the Fall of Suharto," Indonesia 70 (October
2000) : 125-138; The Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite: January 1 , 1999-January 31, 
2001," Indonesia 71 (April 2001): 135-173.
10 On comparable mass media provocations in India, see Paul R. Brass, Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in 
the Representation of Collective Violence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Tambiah, 
Leveling Crowds.
11 See Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick, "Peace Journalism in Poso," Inside Indonesia (April-June
2001) : 24-25; and Kathleen Reen, J. Lance Alloway, Oren A. Murphy, and Yon Thayrun, "Crisis in Poso," 
unpublished report prepared by Intemews Indonesia, June 28,2000.
12 For an overview of Central Sulawesi languages and dialects, see chapters IV-VII in J. Noorduyn, A 
Critical Survey of Studies on the Languages of Sulawesi (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1991).
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became targets of Dutch Protestant missionization, which intensified after 1905 under 
the Ethical policy.13
The indigenous religion of Central Sulawesi highlanders was inseparable from the 
land cleared by their ancestors. Moreover, highland populations traditionally traced 
their group identity—the foundation of what became, under state pluralism, 
"ethnicity"—on their place of origin. Thus the sacral aspect of situationally defined, 
insider versus outsider or "ethnic" disputes over land runs very deep, although it is 
important to note that precolonial vendetta violence and "tribal" warfare did not 
strictly follow highland versus lowland divisions before Dutch interference. During the 
colonial period, however, the relatively small and fragmented highland groups became 
increasingly aware of their minority status on the island compared to more numerous 
lowlanders, such as Bugis or Makasar people. They also became aware of their 
insignificance in the colony, and later the nation, compared to the Javanese. Only the 
Protestantism introduced by European missionaries proposed to unite highland 
settlements into larger confederations forged through church affiliation and even to ally 
them to powerful communities far beyond the borders of their ancestral gardens and 
surrounding rainforests.
A. C. Kruyt opened the earliest and largest mission in Central Sulawesi for the 
Netherlands Mission Society (Nederlands Zendeling Genootschap). The headquarters 
was established in Tentena to proselytize the animists living around Poso Lake. In this 
region, now encompassed by the Poso Regency, indigenous communities became united 
through their colonial experience and began to identify themselves as Pamona (To 
Pamona, literally "those from/of Pamona"). They are almost uniformly members of the 
Central Sulawesi Protestant Church (Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah, or GKST) 
descended from Kruyt's mission.14
In the western highlands south of Palu, by contrast, Protestant missions arrived 
several decades later when the colonial government gave religious jurisdiction over that 
region to the Salvation Army based in England. These two European Protestant 
missions approached their congregations differently in several respects. Of particular 
importance here was the Salvation Army's adoption of the Malay (now, Indonesian) 
language and a uniform, national administration of doctrines and practices, which 
contrasted with Kruyt's use of regional languages and his focus on the Christianization 
of very localized ancestral customs (adat). This latter approach intensified the
13 On the indigenous religion and missionization of western and eastern Central Sulawesi areas 
respectively, see Lorraine V. Aragon, Fields of the Lord: Animism, Christian Minorities, and State 
Development in Indonesia (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000); and Albert Schrauwers, Colonial 
'Reformation' in the Highlands of Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, 1892-1995 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2000).
14 Groups who now call themselves Pamona were named "the Bare'e-speaking Toradja" by Adriani and 
Kruyt. See Nicolaus Adriani and Albertus C. Kruyt, De Bare'e-Sprekende Toradja's van Midden Celebes, 3 
vols, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam: N. V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1950); Joost Cote, "Colonising 
Central Sulawesi: The 'Ethical Policy' and Imperialist Expansion, 1890-1910," Itinerario 20,3 (1996): 87- 
108; Schrauwers, Colonial 'Reformation.'
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development of a religiously based "regional nationalism" among Pamona Protestants 
during the twentieth century.15
In both the western (Palu) and eastern (Poso) areas of Central Sulawesi, the Dutch 
administration sought to enlist the newly missionized highlanders as colonial 
auxiliaries which it hoped would act, collectively, as a Protestant buffer against the 
potential political threat of Islam based at the coasts. The Dutch introduced 
regulations and trade initiatives that disrupted precolonial highland-lowland alliances 
entailing produce exchanges, military support, and "royal" or elite marriages between 
coastal Muslim kingdoms and tributary highland centers.16 Dutch administrators also 
worked to curtail the annual population movements linked to highland swidden 
farming and to centralize the scattered settlements into larger "model" villages.
In the eastern area by Poso Lake, the Dutch were particularly aggressive in 
pressuring the Pamona to abandon swidden rice farming in favor of wet-rice 
agriculture, which they considered more "scientific," productive, and less tied to the 
old "pagan" religion. Protestant missions opened schools and clinics for the new 
highland converts, further isolating them socially from the Muslim coastal populations 
and providing them with distinctive government treatment or "privileges." Educated 
Protestant converts from the highlands were given local bureaucratic positions, 
including assignments as teachers for new schools in remote areas. By the time the 
Japanese invaded and occupied Sulawesi during World War II, most highlanders were 
more closely linked, both economically and socially, to the Protestant missions and the 
Dutch colonial regime than they were to coastal Muslims and urban independence 
movements.
After independence was declared by Sukarno in 1945, Sulawesi highlanders 
suffered further from their strategic location between the Muslim-majority peninsula of 
southwestern Sulawesi and the Protestant-majority peninsula of northern Sulawesi, 
both centers of secessionist movements during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Villagers 
now describe the confusing and violent overflow of these two movements—Permesta in 
North Sulawesi and the Kahar Muzakkar or Darul Islam rebellion in South Sulawesi— 
as the time of "gangs" (gerombolan).
In South Sulawesi, the Japanese occupation and surrender was followed by a 
mutual distrust between highland Protestant Sa'dan Toraja and lowland Muslim Bugis 
factions, even those with seemingly common nationalist goals.17 Moreover, many 
lowland Muslims who fought for national independence were angered by the continuity 
of aristocratic privilege in the Java-centric Republic. A Bugis businessman and former
15 On the concept of "regional nationalism" in Sulawesi, see David E. F. Henley, Nationalism and 
Regionalism in a Colonial Context: Minahasa in the Dutch East Indies (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996); also, 
Schrauwers, Colonial 'Reformation,' pp. 77-88.
16 Items traded from the coasts included sea salt, woven cloth, and bronze trays. Items traded from the 
highlands included gold flakes, dammar resin, rattan, barkcloth, and slaves—although, given significant 
differences in demography and land use, the slave trade from Central Sulawesi was minimal compared to 
that described by Bigalke for South Sulawesi. Terence W. Bigalke, "A Social History of Tana Toraja' 
1870-1965" (PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1981), chap. 2; Lorraine V. Aragon, 
"Twisting the Gift: Translating Precolonial into Colonial Exchanges in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia," 
American Ethnologist 23,1 (1996): 43-60; and Aragon, Fields of the Lord, chapters 3-4.
17 Bigalke, "A Social History," chapter 10.
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Muhairanadiyah teacher named Kahar Muzakkar who fought in Java during the 1945 
revolution was sent by Sukarno's military to persuade disgruntled South Sulawesi 
secessionists to join the Indonesian Republic. He ended up joining and leading the 
rebels instead. In 1953, after he was denied the military command post he demanded, 
Muzakkar allied with the Darul Islam movement from West Java. His aim was to 
install on Sulawesi an Islamic Republic opposed to the "feudalism" of the regional 
nobility, ancestral forms of worship, and Dutch influences such as Protestantism.18
Armed Darul Islam rebels from South Sulawesi moved north through the mountains 
into Central Sulawesi to attack animist and Protestant villages. Highlanders fought 
back with the weapons at hand: machetes, spears, blowpipes, and headhunting 
displays. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of villagers were tortured, killed, or forced to 
flee for their lives and resettle in new areas. Thus the incoming Protestant Permesta 
militias from the Minahasa region of North Sulawesi sometimes were welcomed and 
supported by highland Protestant villages as allies against Muslim attackers from 
South Sulawesi. In the Poso Lake region, however, Permesta forces mistreated locals, 
which led to the creation of a Pamona defensive militia called the Youth Movement of 
Central Sulawesi (Gerakan Pemuda Sulawesi Tengah, GPST).19 This organization 
would disband after Permesta only to be recreated during the 1998 Poso violence.
The Permesta rebellion from North Sulawesi, which joined briefly with Muzakkar's 
Muslim forces, ultimately was resolved as an internal army affair in 1961. The Muslim 
rebellion from South Sulawesi, however, continued until Muzakkar was shot by 
Republican forces in February 1965. Throughout the two decades of regional chaos, 
local Protestant churches, which had gained de facto independence during World War 
II, became the major force of stability and civic organization in the highlands, running 
Sunday services, schools, and clinics in difficult, war-tom circumstances. By contrast, 
most Protestant highlanders experienced the Minahasan and Bugis-led secessionist 
rebels, as well as the Japanese, returning Dutch, and Javanese-led Republican forces as 
threats rather than solutions to their security, subsistence patterns, and local 
autonomy.
The ensuing Suharto regime was a period when highlanders, like most Indonesians, 
acceded to many new regulations over their individual and collective rights in return 
for relatively greater stability and prosperity. Indonesians were required to follow one 
of five government authorized religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, 
or Buddhism. Whereas the Protestant population in the nation was only about 6 
percent, the Protestant population of Central Sulawesi was nearly 20 percent, spread 
throughout most of the interior land as well as the mission-influenced town of Poso. 
The more dense coastal settlements still gave Muslims a provincial majority of 76
18 See Barbara S. Harvey, "Tradition, Islam, and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950-1965" (PhD dissertation, 
Cornell University, 1974); Barbara S. Harvey, Permesta: Haifa Rebellion (Ithaca: Cornell Modem 
Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, 1977); and Audrey R. and George McT. Kahin, Subversion as 
Foreign Polio/: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York: The New Press, 1995). 
See also, Bigalke, "A Social History," chapter 11; Gregory L. Acciaioli, "Searching for Good Fortune: The 
Making of a Bugis Shore Community at Lake Lindu, Central Sulawesi" (PhD dissertation, Australian 
National University, 1989); and Thomas Gibson, "Islam and the Spirit Cults in New Order Indonesia: 
Global Flows vs. Local Knowledge," Indonesia 69 (April 2000): 41-70.
19 Schrauwers, Colonial 'Reformation,' pp. 82-84.
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percent, but that was significantly less than the roughly 87 percent majority they held 
in the Indonesian population as a whole during the 1980s. Catholics, already a tiny 3 
percent minority in the nation made up a negligible .3 percent in the province.20 During 
most of the Suharto regime, the Central Sulawesi highlands were solidly Protestant and 
Protestants engaged in a modicum of power sharing, at the district (kecamatan), and 
sometimes even regency (kabupaten), level, with the more numerous Muslims who 
dwelled on smaller, urban areas at the coasts. The Protestant domination of civil 
service positions under the Dutch gradually was modified by influence from the 
national Muslim majority.
Despite their overwhelming national majority, however, Indonesian Muslims often 
saw their organizations repressed by the early Suharto regime in which Catholic 
intelligence personnel and military commanders such as Benny Murdani played a 
major role. Continuing the Dutch colonial policy on Islam developed by Snouck 
Hurgronje, the early Suharto regime patronized Muslim ritual and charitable activities 
while neutralizing its threat as a potential political challenge. This policy shifted 
dramatically in the last decade of Suharto's rule with the creation of new institutions 
such as the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI). Chaired by Vice- 
President Habibie, the organization sought to patronize modernist Muslims as 
economic development agents—making an implicit distinction between these Muslims 
and ethnic Chinese, who usually are Christians.21
Even as early as 1978, Muslim demands led Protestant proselytizing and mission 
funding to be more closely controlled by the Suharto government, and many Central 
Sulawesi clinics and schools that had been funded and operated by Protestant 
churches were seized by the government.22 The Suharto regime increasingly installed 
modernist Muslims in high military posts, supported Islamic banking, intensified 
Islamic studies in the school curriculum, and funded more Islamic schools and 
buildings. President Suharto even performed the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1991. Although 
such pro-Muslim acts and signals issued at the highest levels of government developed 
in concert with, rather than simply created, popular trends such as Islamic ritual 
reform, veiling by women, and Muslim banking, the cumulative impact was a distinct 
national shift favoring Islam.23
20 The Suharto government stopped releasing census figures on the nation's religious composition in the late 
1980s, presumably for fear of reactions to a Muslim decline. See Rita Smith Kipp, Dissociated Identities: 
Ethnicity, Religion, and Class in an Indonesian Society (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), p. 
101. The percentages here are drawn from Statistik Indonesia 1986 (Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 1987), pp. 
168-169; and, Indonesia 1992: An Official Handbook (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1992), pp. 55-72.
21 Robert W. Hefner, "Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle 
Class," Indonesia 56 (1993): 1-37. On the distinctive colonial experience of, and resentment against, ethnic 
Chinese, see The Role of the Indonesian Chinese in Shaping Modern Indonesian Life, special issue of Indonesia 
(Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asian Program, 1991); and James T. Siegel, Solo in the New Order: Language and 
Hierarchy in an Indonesian City (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), chapter 9.
22 Hyung-Jun Kim, "The Changing Interpretation of Religious Freedom in Indonesia," Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies 29,2 (1998): 357-373; Aragon, Fields of the Lord, p. 304.
23 John R. Bowen, Muslims through Discourse (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Suzanne A. 
Brenner, "Reconstructing Self and Society: Javanese Muslim Women and 'the Veil,"' American Ethnologist 
23,4 (1996): 673-697; Hefner, "Islam, State, and Civil Society"; Hefner, Civil Islam; and Robert W. Hefner,
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The policy changes promoted entrenchment on both sides. They enhanced citizens' 
perceptions of past economic and political discrimination towards Muslims, and 
present and future discrimination towards Christians. In Central Sulawesi, Muslim and 
Protestant groups competed to present themselves as favored, even "blessed," vehicles 
for economic development, often using funds sent from Jakarta or overseas. These 
contests attracted attention as well as indignation in urban areas with the construction 
of increasingly more ostentatious churches and mosques, buildings that became 
targeted symbols of undeserved wealth and enmity during the communal conflicts in 
Poso and elsewhere.
Postindependence Legal, Demographic, and Economic Shifts
Between the 1960s and the 1990s, Indonesian legislation decreased traditional land 
and political rights in service of national goals.24 The 1960 Basic Agrarian Law ceded 
legal control of customarily held village land (tanah adat) to the state for potential 
development purposes. New forestry and investment laws in 1967 allowed foreign 
companies to finance and control industries in forested interior areas. Suharto's 1973 
Presidential Decree No. 2 designated Central Sulawesi and nine other outer island 
provinces as new transmigration sites, where the aim became less to relieve population 
problems on Java than to stimulate more profitable outer island agriculture and 
"national development."25 The 1974 Regional Government Law and the 1979 Village 
Government Law then removed power from customary councils of elders and placed it 
in the hands of the national civil service bureaucracy, increasing political control by 
outsiders.26
In eastern Central Sulawesi, both voluntary migration from South Sulawesi and 
government-sponsored transmigration programs for Javanese and Balinese, which 
began as early as the 1950s, augmented mainly the Muslim and Hindu populations.27 
With the new roads and development projects initiated during the Suharto regime, 
Poso grew from a tiny fishing port and farming town to a bustling regency capital. The 
ambitiously named Trans-Sulawesi Highway was built along the coasts wherever 
possible, but transected the mountainous interior directly south of Poso via Tentena en 
route to South Sulawesi.
"Markets and Justice for Muslim Indonesians," in Market Cultures: Society and Morality in the New Asian 
Capitalisms, ed. Robert W. Hefner (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 224-259.
24 Michael R. Dove, "The Agroecological Mythology of the Javanese and the Political Economy of 
Indonesia," Indonesia 39 (1985): 1-36; Colin MacAndrews, Land Policy in Modern Indonesia (Boston: 
Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1986); Nancy Lee Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992).
25 Timothy Babcock, "Transmigration: The Regional Impact of a Miracle Cure," in Central Government and 
Local Development in Indonesia, ed. Colin MacAndrews (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 
157-189.
26 Tsuyoshi Kato, "Different Fields, Similar Locusts: Adat Communities and the Village Law of 1979 in 
Indonesia," Indonesia 47 (1989): 89-114.
27 A segment of the early Balinese transmigrants were Protestant converts no longer welcome in Hindu Bali. 
See Gloria Davis, "Parigi: A Social History of the Balinese Movement to Central Sulawesi, 1907-1974" 
(PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 1976).
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As forests still covered well over half of the province's surface through the 1980s, 
New Order development in Central Sulawesi focused on timber industries. High-value 
hardwoods such as ebony, which grow in the forests around Poso Lake, were targeted 
because of the mountainous terrain and limited interior roadways. News reports 
periodically noted that ebony, worth thousands of US dollars per cubic meter, was 
being cut illegally and smuggled by truck from Poso via Palu's shipping ports to evade 
government controls and taxation.28 Few indigenous Pamona were direct economic 
beneficiaries of this extractive industry, which tended to employ Muslim immigrants.
Family-based farming of cash crops also generated new wealth, but again mostly 
for ambitious Muslim migrants and urban merchants, including Chinese ones. Although 
Pamona and other highland Protestants did grow some cash crops such as cloves, 
coffee, and cacao, highlanders remained primarily subsistence rice farmers. Few 
became involved in market activities beyond the sale of small crop surpluses in 
exchange for basic supplies or cash needs. While Muslim Bugis or Makasar migrants 
became middleman traders or worked for private businesses through their patron- 
client networks, Protestant highlanders traditionally had no capitalist business 
experience and much more localized exchange networks.29 Many ran up high-interest 
debts to immigrant salespeople, whose kiosks offered credit, and so found their next 
season's produce already owed before harvest.
Highlanders traditionally left their ancestral villages only for higher education, 
church employment, or civil service jobs, if they could obtain them. As non-Pamona 
bought up or were allotted lands through transmigration programs, many Pamona 
youths found themselves landless as well as jobless by the end of the Suharto regime. 
Opportunities for social mobility depended upon personal connections to members of 
the regional bureaucracy. Indigenous groups' access to positions remained available 
mainly to descendants of the precolonial nobility, and Protestants' ties to recognized 
aristocracies were fewer than those of Muslims. Although a small percentage of 
Protestant Pamona leaders did increase their economic standing dramatically during 
the New Order, the mass of Pamona and other highland Protestant farmers did not.
After the financial crisis of 1997, even more voluntary migrants entered the Poso 
Regency from South Sulawesi, and many purchased land to raise cacao. Cacao had 
become the "hot" export crop, as its sale price in rupiah, which was pegged to the US 
dollar, continued to rise while the fixed rupiah value of salaries and many other local 
products fell due to inflation. Informal reports note that Bugis migrants angered 
Pamona and other indigenous Protestant groups by entering "their" ancestral forests 
with chainsaws to clear fields for cacao and other cash crop plantations. Whereas 
Muslims claimed that Muslim immigrants worked harder than the indigenous peoples, 
Protestant residents saw their declining relative population and economic status as 
engineered by the increasingly Muslim government officials who benefited most from 
the commercial industries and plantations favored by Jakarta. In contrast to many 
areas of western Central Sulawesi, the Poso Regency began to lose its earlier
28 "Illegal Ebony Tree Cutters Get Minister's Warning," Jakarta Post, November 24,1990.
29 On Bugis strategies of migration and trade dominance, see Acciaioli, "Searching for Good Fortune," and 
Gregory Acciaioli, "Kinship and Debt: The Social Organization of Bugis Migration and Fish Marketing at 
Lake Lindu, Central Sulawesi," in Authority and Enterprise among the Peoples of South Sulawesi, ed. Roger 
Tol, Kees van Dijk, and Greg Acciaioli (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2000), pp. 211-239.
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demographic balance and exchange relationship between a Muslim-dominated 
lowlands and a Protestant-dominated highlands.
Although refugees from Poso, as well as less affected provincial observers, 
uniformly described their surprise and shock at the ethnoreligious violence beginning in 
1998, there were earlier signs of trouble. The 1998-2000 fighting in Poso echoed 
comparable market fights, nighttime attacks, and religious threats that occurred and 
were repressed militarily in both Palu and Poso during the decade before Suharto 
resigned.30 Additional communal conflicts occurred at both transmigration and 
voluntary migration sites in Central Sulawesi, which became arenas for small-scale 
ethnic disputes over land rights.31 Although most of the problems were between locals 
and immigrants of different religions (particularly Protestants and Muslims), some 
conflicts between Poso Regency indigenes and South Sulawesi migrants took place in 
the Bungku area where both groups were Muslim.32 Such data indicate that insider- 
outsider friction over the economic use of land, rather than religious strife per se, was 
the basal line of fracture. Immigrants in Central Sulawesi, formerly few in number, were 
expected to defer to elders and to the customary practices (adat) of the original land­
clearing group. These expectations increasingly were not met in the New Order when 
migrants began to view themselves as national citizens equally entitled to resource 
appropriation as longtime residents 33 In Poso Regency, the apparently uniform yet 
unequally beneficial regulations of the New Order only exacerbated the Protestant 
Pamonas' regional nationalism.
As the town of Poso grew during the Suharto regime, it became increasingly diverse 
ethnically. Protestants besides Pamona included Minahasans, Balinese, and Chinese as 
well as Mori, Napu, Besoa, and Bada' people from within the regency. Muslims 
included Arabs, Javanese, Bugis, Makasar, Mandar, Buton, and Kaili people as well as 
Tojo, Togian (Togean), and Bungku people from the regency 34 The small Catholic 
minority was comprised of Minahasans and Chinese, as well as migrants from former 
Portuguese colonies such as Flores. Balinese were the only Hindus. Overall, by the late 
1990s, the Muslim percentage of the Poso city population exceeded 50 percent, and 
Muslim Bugis gained control of much urban commerce. Simultaneously, according to 
reports, competition increased between Muslim Bugis and Christian Chinese business 
people applying to receive development contracts through the regent's office. Given 
Indonesian patron-client relations that follow communal lines, it became clear that the 
selection of the next Poso regent would largely determine which ethnic or religious
30 A few of these events are described in Aragon, Fields of the Lord, pp. 316-317; Lorraine V. Aragon, "Can 
Central Sulawesi Christians and Muslims Get Along?" Antropologi Indonesia 24,63 (2000): 59-64; 
Schrauwers, Colonial 'Reformation,' pp. 91-92, 226-227.
31 See Greg Acciaioli, "Placing Claims to Land: The Grounds of Religious and Ethnic Conflict at Lake 
Lindu, Central Sulawesi," in this volume, and Aragon, Fields of the Lord, pp. 303-304.
32 Kie-Eng Go, "Political Agenda behind the Riot of Poso," presented in the Briefing on the Current Human 
Rights Issues in Indonesia with the US Congressional Human Rights Caucus, February 9,1999.
33 Acciaioli, "Placing Claims to Land"; Aragon, Fields of the Lord, pp. 303-304.
34 Throughout this text, Makasar designates the ethnic group of South Sulawesi origin, whereas Makassar 
(with a double "s") is the new, official name of the provincial capital of South Sulawesi, which was called 
Ujung Pandang during the Suharto regime. Togean also is a new spelling of Togian that is gaining currency 
and geopolitical import.
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groups would have the most political and economic support from the next regency 
administration.
The 1998-1999 Regent Contest and Political Context
Sulawesi was a single administrative unit with its capital in the southern, Muslim- 
majority city of Makassar (formerly Ujung Pandang) before the separate Christian- 
majority province of North Sulawesi was created in 1957 under pressure from 
Permesta leaders. Central Sulawesi later was separated from North Sulawesi in 1964 
following similar demands for regional autonomy. Pressed by further appeals in late 
1999 (between Poso's first and second conflict phases described below), President 
Habibie created a wealth of new regencies and provinces, including several in Sulawesi. 
These show some signs of religious redistricting or even gerrymandering. A new, mainly 
Muslim, regency of Morowali (including a small Protestant Mori minority within a 
larger, Muslim Bungku majority) was split off from the Protestant-majority Poso 
Regency, which had been territorially stable during the New Order. Additionally, a 
new Muslim-majority province of Gorontalo was separated from the southern area of 
Protestant-majority North Sulawesi. Thus, Central Sulawesi became located between 
two other Muslim-majority provinces, and more Muslim-majority regencies were 
created, leaving Poso Regency, with its anomalous Protestant population, smaller and 
more isolated.
During the Suharto regime, regents (bupati) were elected by the Regional People's 
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Tingkat Dua, or DPRD II) 
in consultation with the governor who, when an agreement had been reached, 
forwarded the nomination to the Minister of the Interior (Menteri dalam Negeri, or 
M endagri).3 *5 When the Poso conflicts began in late 1998, Habibie had replaced 
Suharto, and the Central Sulawesi governor was a Muslim retired army officer named 
H. B. Paliudju from the Da'a Kaili ethnic group originating in the mountains west of 
Palu.36 Most Da'a cure Salvation Army Protestants. Beyond his military connections, 
one of Paliudju's strengths as governor likely was that he could appeal on religious 
grounds to the province's Muslim majority and yet appeal on ethnic grounds to the 
area's indigenous groups, including Protestant highlanders. Paliudju, however, lost 
support from Jakarta after the 1999 elections, probably because he had opposed 
Megawati's leadership of PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, the 
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle). Paliudju was replaced in February 2001 by 
Aminuddin Ponulele, former rector of Tadulako University in Palu and a member of a 
prominent Muslim, coastal Kaili family. Ponulele was supported by Golkar, which won
33 On the complexities, past manipulation, and present confusion in regency elections, see Michael Malley, 
"Regions: Centralization and Resistance," in Indonesia Beyond Suharto, ed. Donald K. Emmerson (Armonk,
NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 71-105; and Reen et al., "Crisis in Poso."
3  ^Reportedly there was an upset in 1995 when the Minister of the Interior, Moch Yogie SM, and a DPR
Golkar leader named Harmoko advanced Paliudju over several other leading Muslim contenders for 
governor. See "Soal Balon Gubemor Sulteng FKPPI Sulteng Ajukan Tiga Jendral," Republika, November 3, 
1995.
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twenty-one of forty-five seats in the DPRD, and by PDIP, which came in second in the 
elections.37
Habibie, although of mixed Javanese and Arab descent, was bom and raised in 
South Sulawesi, which gave him native son (anak daerah) support in that province, as 
well as from modernist Muslims more generally. Even in the 1999 elections, as Golkar's 
vote plummeted nationally, Golkar still received roughly 37-85 percent of votes in the 
individual Poso Regency districts (kecamatan), and almost 55 percent overall in Central 
Sulawesi, compared to only 26 percent nationwide.38 Golkar's support in some 
districts of Poso Regency and throughout the province, however, may have had less to 
do with Habibie's personal appeal than to the inertia of the past status quo. Central 
Sulawesi villagers long had been pressured by New Order officials to vote only Golkar, 
and many no doubt desired to stay on the good side of the government in power, with 
its promises of village development funds.
When the Poso violence began in December 1998, the incumbent Poso regent was a 
Golkar-backed Muslim named Arief Patanga whose term was due to expire in June 
1999. Arief Patanga's ethnicity was unknown or unclear (nggak jelas) to most 
Indonesians or foreigners I questioned, but an Indonesian NGO worker identified his 
heritage as Tojo, a precolonial, Bugis-influenced, Muslim kingdom and now district 
(kecamatan) centered east of Poso and west of Ampana.39 A Pamona Protestant 
candidate named Yahya Patiro sought the regent opening with the support of many 
Protestants in the district. Patiro was second in command to Patanga as regional 
secretary (secretaris wilayah daerah, or sekwilda), an example of the kind of Muslim- 
Protestant power split that had been brokered in prior decades. Patiro was 
championed by Herman Parimo, a Pamona member of the Regional People's 
Representative Council (DPRD II) who also had widespread Protestant support. 
Patiro's main competitor was a PPP-supported (PPP, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, 
the Unity Development Party) Muslim candidate named Damsyik Ladjalani, whose 
family was from the Togian Islands, just north of Poso. The Togian Islands are a 
midpoint linking Bugis-dominated trade between Gorontalo to the north and Ampana 
to the south. There was also another Muslim candidate seeking Golkar support named 
Abdul Muin Pusadan. Originating from the distant Bungku area, Pusadan was 
originally considered to be an underdog, unlikely to win. Pusadan did triumph, 
however, after the reputations of all the other major candidates were impugned during 
the Poso conflicts.
The Conflict Phases
Presenting the chronology of a communal conflict entails inevitable problems in 
sequencing as well as in selecting which fragments to include.40 Recounting the Poso
37 Ahmad Setiawan, "Jabatan Diharap, Restu Digarap," Detak No. 122, November 27,2000.
381 am indebted to Kevin Evans for data on Central Sulawesi and Poso Regency voting outcomes by party.
39 The Tojo "kingdom" is described briefly in Adriani and Kruyt, De Bare'e Toradja's, vol. 1, and in Jane M. 
Atkinson, The Art and Politics of Wana Shamanship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
40 Veena Das, "Specificities: Official Narratives, Rumor, and the Social Production of Hate," Social 
Identities 4,1 (1998): 109-130, p. 110; Tambiah, Leveling Crowds, pp. 317-320.
60 Lorraine V. Aragon
conflicts is especially problematic. I did not reach the Poso Regency during the active 
conflict period and, understandably, both Christian and Muslim refugees I interviewed 
elsewhere presented one-sided narratives characterized by extreme passion and 
limited scope. As my earlier fieldwork was based primarily in the highlands, I have 
slightly greater knowledge of Protestants' historical and contemporary interests. 
Nevertheless, I also have Muslim friends in the province, and my sympathies lie with 
all individuals and communities injured by these events.
I rely, then, on much layering of my own inquiries with others' documents, 
especially journalism and NGO reports. Yet, most journalism about the Poso violence 
has been stilted and less than thorough for several reasons. The major news 
publications had their attention focused on more glaring problems in Java, Aceh, East 
Timor, Irian (West Papua), and Maluku, to name just a few. Sulawesi journalists not 
only had little training in the responsible coverage of communal conflicts, they too were 
enmeshed in familiar Indonesian financial problems. Many could not afford carfare to 
Poso or long-distance telephone calls, so they relied on the reports of newly arriving 
refugees and inflammatory rumors. Dependence on refugees' reports undoubtedly 
amplified the coverage of Christians' experiences of Phases One and Two, and 
Muslims' experiences of Phase Three. Reporters generally also were cautious in their 
approach and in their portrayals of government officials, since they too, like so many 
others, were subject to the sway of money-filled envelopes (amplop or empelop). 
Therefore, the chronology below must be considered preliminary. The sequencing 
separates what observers since the second incident in April 2000 have called the 
conflict "phases" (fase) or "chapters" (jilid or bab). Phases One and Two are clearly 
separated in time by over a year, while Two and Three are separated by only a few 
weeks and are clearly related. Phase Four is somewhat less well defined because it is 
still ongoing.
Phase One
Reports agree that violence in the city of Poso began with a quarrel between two 
drunken youths on December 24, 1998, the eve of both Christmas and Ramadan. A 
young reveler from the Protestant Lombogia neighborhood ended up knifing the hand 
of a youth from the Muslim Kayamanya neighborhood. The residents of Kayamanya, 
situated just west of the Poso River, generally were of Bugis descent, with many 
originating from Wotu, a South Sulawesi village in the Gulf of Bone, where the dialect 
shows similarities with Bugis, Pamona, Buton, and Kaili languages.41 Many 
Kayamanya residents were affiliated with local Al-Khaira'at organizations, although 
few had received advanced formal education.42 By contrast, most residents of 
Lombogia, located across the river, were of Pamona, Mori, and Minahasa descent. 
They included many civil servants, retired military, and other middle-class 
Protestants.
41 Noorduyn, A Critical Survey, pp. 134-135.
42 Al-Khaira'at is an Islamic school system that was founded in the early twentieth century by a member of 
the Al-Jufri clan who migrated from the Middle East. Although the organization is based in Palu, it now has 
1,200 branches in eight provinces of eastern Indonesia.
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The injured Muslim youth from Kayamanya fled to a mosque, and group hostilities 
escalated quickly the following morning. Religious leaders from both sides met and 
jointly blamed the evil influence of alcohol. They decided to enforce a ban on its sale 
during Ramadan. Police then began seizing and destroying liquor for sale in the city. 
Some Muslim youths, however, escalated the property attacks, mainly against 
establishments owned by Christian Chinese. Protestant youths then became involved 
in defending the shops. Alcohol was given to them, or hidden, and religious battle lines 
etched deeper.43
Rumors spread to neighboring towns that Poso churches were being burned, and 
hundreds of Protestant Pamona farmers congregated in the town hall of Tagolu, just 
seven kilometers south of Poso. The recently assigned Javanese police chief and other 
city officials assured the Protestants that no churches had been harmed. Yet, on 
Sunday evening, December 27, scores of machete-armed Pamona from the GKST 
stronghold of Tentena arrived by truck to reinforce the threatened GKST Protestants of 
Lombogia. These trucks, which witnesses said were led by the DPRDII representative 
Herman Parimo, carried members of the Gerakan Pemuda Sulawesi Tengah (GPST), a 
resurrected version of the Protestant Pamona militia organization dating back to the 
Permesta period.44 Apparently, Parimo had been involved with the original GPST 
group in his youth. Many Muslims later would blame the initiation of group aggression 
in Phase One on Parimo's leadership and his anger that Patiro, supported by his 
Protestant Pamona political faction, was eliminated by Muslim leaders in the early 
DPRD II nominations for regent. Other Muslim leaders would blame the candidate 
Patiro directly.45 Christians, by contrast, would defend these two men and deem their 
protective actions fully justified.
The next morning, the Protestant groups, strengthened by reinforcements and 
armed with homemade weapons, began clashing with Muslims in front of the Poso 
police barracks. Truckloads of Muslim reinforcements also arrived from the Muslim 
Bugis and Kaili area of Parigi to the west.46 Several town officials and religious leaders 
tried to negotiate peace between the two uneasy sides but, as soon as authorities left, 
some Muslim mobs began to attack Protestant and Catholic property, looting and 
burning homes as well as commercial buildings. Thousands of Poso residents and 
outsiders were drawn into the rioting, which continued for over a week and spilled 
beyond the borders of the city to towns along Poso's three major access roads (west, 
east, and south). During the week of turmoil, nearly two hundred people were injured, 
mostly Protestants, some tortured by being stabbed, burned, or dragged by ropes from 
vehicles. Roughly four hundred Protestant and Catholic families saw their houses 
destroyed. The homes of the Muslim regent, Patanga, and the two Protestant leaders, 
Patiro and Parimo, reportedly were stormed, although the families were evacuated
43 David Rohde, "Indonesia Unraveling?" Foreign Affairs 80,4 (2001): 110-124, esp. p. 117; see also 
"Kerusuhan di Poso, 79 Orang Luka," Detikcom, December 28,1998; Reen et al., "Crisis in Poso."
44 "Kota Poso Masih Mencekam," Kompas, December 29,1998; on the GPST, see Schrauwers, Colonial 
'Reformation,' p. 83.
45 Yahya Al-Amri, "Panglima Perang Pasukan Putih," yahoo.com.gmup/sabili2000, June 29, 2000.
46 "Poso More Restless Again," Kompas, December 29,1998.
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safely.47 The bus terminal along with stores, restaurants, hotels, and vehicles owned 
mainly by Chinese Protestants and Catholics were burned down. Some Muslim city 
officials later claimed they made futile attempts to quiet the crowds by calling on them 
to stop fighting, but other reports indicate that employees from those same officials' 
offices urged the mobs towards arson and violence.
Even in the first days of fighting, Poso Protestants sending personal reports 
claimed that Protestants had long been "stepped on" (diinjak-injak), and for that 
reason, they feared that their community might become vengeful. Many were convinced 
that the violence was provoked from outside the region. One writer called for prayers 
that Poso Protestants would not be trapped into revenge because "whenever 
Protestants are provoked [terpancing], it is exactly that which is hoped for by 
provocateurs [para provokator] whose quarrels arrive from outside Central Sulawesi." 48 49
Governor Paliudju was contacted in Palu for assistance within a day of the first 
communal bloodshed, but as one local Protestant commented immediately, "we cannot 
hope for very much from the security forces [aparat keamanan].'"19 The Poso police, as 
well as reinforcements sent from Palu, were unable or unwilling to control the situation. 
Some police would later explain that they hesitated to get involved, noting the influx of 
non-local mobs, both Protestant and Muslim, unwilling to heed calls for restraint. They 
did claim, however, to have sealed all roads to Poso from further rogue militias.50
By the end of Christmas week, Protestant supporters who came from the highlands 
and Muslim supporters from the coastal towns retreated, as drenching rains turned 
Poso into a sea of mud, and fighting diminished. Governor Paliudju then arrived to 
discuss matters with local political and religious leaders in the office of the regent, 
Arief Patanga.51 Muslim leaders vehemently demanded arrests of the Protestant 
leaders, and news reports announced a search for Herman Parimo, the suspected 
"mastermind" of the riots.52
One of the factors that exacerbated tensions was the appearance of fliers, banners, 
and graffiti that attacked Parimo and Patiro, the regent candidate he supported. These 
messages began before December 24, and they multiplied thereafter. A banner 
demanding that these men be hanged was posted for over a month on a mosque in the 
Kayamanya neighborhood. Christian analysts considered the anonymous message 
campaign to have been a successful effort to intimidate the Protestant Pamona faction, 
inflame the Muslim Bugis factions, and prevent Patiro from being selected as regent.53
47 Johan Budi S.P., Iwan Setiawan, Darlis Muhammad, "Tragedi Poso Duka Kita Bersama," Tempo, June 
12-18, 2000; also Kie-Eng Go, "Political Agenda."
48 Confidential Protestant e-mail source, December 28,1998.
49 Confidential Protestant e-mail source, December 30,1998.
50 "Kerusuhan di Poso, 79 Orang Luka," Detikcom, December 28,1998; "Petugas Keamanan Tutup Semua 
Pintu Masuk ke Poso," Kompas, December 29,1998.
51 "Hujan Deras, Kerusuhan Poso Reda," Detikcom, December 29,1998.
52 "Petugas Keamanan," Kompas, December 29,1998, and "In Poso is Formed a Joint Security Force," 
Kompas, December 30,1998.
53 Kie-Eng Go, "Political Agenda"; also, M. Hartingsih, "Memadamkan Api Dalam Sekam," Kompas, 
December 1,2000.
Communal Violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi 63
On December 30, Major General Marasabessy, an Ambonese Muslim leading 
Sulawesi's Wirabuana Military Command, announced that the four days of riots had 
not been caused by disputes among ethnic or religious groups (suku, agama, ras, antara 
golongan, or SARA), or by the political fight for the regent position. Rather, eight 
unidentified individuals (oknum) had provoked the disturbances. Now that these eight 
troublemakers were in his custody, everything was under control, he said.54 The 
military's official pronouncements not only provided the requisite "good news" to 
Jakarta, but also focused on a "de-ideologized" criminality that denied the presence of 
any regional social problems. On January 2, 1999, Marasabessy reported on local 
Sulawesi television that the eight Protestants he had just arrested were responsible for 
the riots.55 No Muslims were prosecuted for the vandalism, arson, or battery, and this 
seemingly one-sided, religiously partisan, reaction caused Protestants to be 
increasingly dissatisfied, though they did not retaliate at that time.
Herman Parimo was jailed for leading the Pamona youth group to violence, 
although his candidate Patiro was exonerated of incitement to violence by a 
gubernatorial investigation. Patiro's exoneration and later reassignment to the 
provincial administration (Pemda I) further angered Poso Muslims convinced of his 
guilt. In July 1999, after seven months in jail without a trial, Parimo engaged in a four- 
day hunger strike to protest his situation. On August 30, 1999, he was brought to trial 
in Palu.56 Parimo, age sixty-four, was convicted and sentenced to fourteen years 
imprisonment. While his case was on appeal, however, he became ill, underwent 
hospital treatment in Makassar, and died in April 2000.57
Parimo's supporters protested that he was framed, while those who disseminated 
the slanderous leaflets that provoked violence from Protestants and Muslims went 
free. A May 24, 1999 letter to Governor Paliudju by a relative of Parimo's wife, a 
Protestant Pamona civil servant named Ir. A. L. Lateka, argued that the lame-duck 
regent, Arief Patanga, was really responsible for provoking the riots.58 Poso police 
chief Woerjantono indeed eventually linked the Muslim regent's younger brother (adik 
kandung), Agfar Patanga, to the flier campaign and charged him with the crime of 
incitement to violence. Christians note angrily that, although ultimately convicted and 
sentenced to two years in prison, Agfar Patanga never served any jail time and 
continued work as a civil servant with a reassigned position. Reportedly, Arief 
Patanga and his supporters attempted to interfere in Agfar's trial to prevent the 
conviction and incarceration. Possibly for this reason, and because of ties to his
54 "Kerusuhan Poso Akibat Provokasi 8 Oknum," Detikcom, December 30,1998. Marasabessy was a close 
ally of Wiranto and similarly opposed to the depoliticization of the military favored by Wahid. See The 
Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite."
55 Kie-Eng Go, "Political Agenda."
56 "Daerah Sekilas," Kotnpas, April 27,1999; "Kilasan Hukum," Kompas, July 12,1999; "Daerah Sekilas," 
Kompas, September 1,1999.
57 One article in an Al-Khaira'at-affiliated Palu tabloid claimed that Parimo's death during medical 
treatment was suspicious, and it implied he is still alive and in hiding; "Teka-teki Kematian Herman 
Parimo," Mai, Week 4, July 2000, p. 11.
58 Budi, Setiawan, and Muhammad, "Tragedi Poso." According to Gatra, June 9,2000, and Mai, Week 4,
July 2000, Lateka worked in the Central Sulawesi Coordination Agency for Investments (Badan 
Koordinasi Penanaman Modal or BKPMD Sulawesi Tengah).
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brother's leafleting campaign, Arief Patanga was removed from the regent post 
prematurely by Governor Paliudju in June 1999.59
In June 1999, Indonesia also held its first free elections in over three decades, and 
Abdurrahman Wahid was selected president by the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat, People's Consultative Assembly) in October. As mentioned above, Golkar 
won the largest percentage of Poso regency votes in the 1999 elections. The Protestant 
Patiro and the Muslim, PPP-backed, Ladjalani were eliminated from the nominations. 
The Golkar party instead supported, and the governor installed, Muin Pusadan from 
the Muslim-majority Bungku area, located about two hundred kilometers southeast of 
Poso. The new regional secretary, Malik Syahadat, and the new speaker of the DPRD 
II, Akram Kamaruddin, also were Golkar-affiliated Muslims from Bungku, a center of 
the brand new Morowali Regency created by Habibie in September 1999.
This political turn of events disappointed not only the Pamona and other 
Christians who had supported Patiro, but also the Muslim supporters of Ladjalani, 
who insisted that he at least should receive the regional secretary position.60 In mid- 
April, 2000, a PPP-affiliated, Muslim DPRD I member named Hailani Umar predicted 
more violence in Poso.61 He indicated that the Muslim population of Poso was furious 
and would riot again if Ladjalani, who was head of Central Sulawesi's Agency for 
Regional Development (Ketua Badan Pembangunan Daerah), was not elevated to the 
regional secretary post. In fact, however, Ladjalani was demoted to become the 
assistant head of Central Sulawesi's Agency for Regional Development—not the 
promotion his supporters had demanded.62 Umar's forecast of impending violence 
was reported in the Palu daily newspaper Mercusuar on April 15, 2000, and Phase 
Two began the following day.
Phase Two
The brawl that began Phase Two again involved drunken youths, one Protestant 
and one Muslim, who began fighting at Poso's central bus terminal.63 The Muslim boy 
claimed when he returned home to Kayamanya that the knife wound on his arm was 
the work of a Protestant "outsider," probably from Manado. The next day, Muslims 
from Kayamanya pursued the alleged attacker in nearby neighborhoods, finally knifing
59 His removal is reported but unexplained by "Daerah Sekilas," Kompas, June 16,1999.
60 Budi, Setiawan, and Muhammad, "Tragedi Poso."
61 Iwan Triono, "Buntut Kerusuhan Poso Wartawan Menara Calon Tersangka," Detikcom, April 28, 2000; 
and Agus Dwi Prabowo, "Setelah Kerusuhan Kini Banyak Warga Poso Belum Kembali," Bidikcom, April 
28, 2000.
62 Andono Wibisono, "Poso Bakal Rusuh Kembali," Mercusuar, April 15,2000, p. 1; "Buntut Kerusuhan 
Poso: Wartawan Diperiksa sebagai Saksi," Kompas, April 29, 2000.
63 Reen et al., "Crisis in Poso"; Paul Dillon, "This Entire Situation Could Explode at Any Moment: Holy 
War Massacre," The Toronto Star, July 1, 2000; and "Poso (Sulawesi Tengah) Rusuh Lagi," Eskol-Net,
April 18, 2000. In Central Sulawesi, it is not just Christians and preman Muslims who sometimes drink 
alcohol. Indigenous groups formerly drank palm wine (fermented to widely varying strengths), especially at 
holidays, and some villagers still do despite disapproval by Muslim and some Protestant clerics. In addition 
to rural homemade brews, both Bir Bintang and a commercially distilled liquor named Cap Tikus sell well 
in urban areas, even to some Muslim middle-class men and civil servants.
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his Toraja father from behind. Angry crowds assembled, more people were injured, 
and Muslims began to bum down Protestants' houses that night. Many Protestants 
whose houses were plundered and burned in the next few days fled to the Protestant 
hillsides above Lombogia or south by road to Tentena.64 Attacked ethnic Chinese also 
fled to towns where they had relatives, which sometimes was to other provinces or 
islands.
Poso police chief Woerjantono called in a unit of the Brimob (riot-control Mobil 
Brigade) from Palu, which tried to restrain Muslim groups attempting to burn 
Protestant churches and homes. Unable to control the rioters, Brimob personnel fired 
live ammunition into the crowd and killed three Muslims. When Governor Paliudju 
came to Poso the next day to promote peace, incensed Muslim leaders led by a 
businessman named Aliansah Tompo (also called Maro) met him in Regent Pusadan's 
office and presented him with a set of demands "in the name of the people." They 
insisted that Chief Woerjantono be fired, that the Brimob unit be sent back to Palu, 
that the lawsuit against Agfar Patanga be stopped, and that Ladjalani be given the 
regional secretary position. At the time, Woerjantono was investigating alleged fraud in 
a government farm loan program (Kredit Usaha Tani, or KUT) by both Tompo and 
Patanga, just as Patanga's trial was due to resume the following week. 65
The Brimob unit was sent home in an effort to reduce tensions but, soon 
afterwards, house burnings continued. There also was an incident where an 
unidentified person was found stabbed to death beside a Muslim hat (kopiah) on the 
street of a Protestant neighborhood. Some sources suggest the corpse, which was 
mysteriously discovered by unrecognizable people, had been planted at the spot by 
Muslim provocateurs. In any case, outraged Muslims, reinforced by outsiders who 
arrived from coastal areas east and west of Poso, began burning more houses and 
churches as well as a PDIP headquarters.66 Both Muslim and Protestant groups 
reportedly used "handy-talkies" and other electronic communication devices to 
coordinate with their community networks. Muslim groups then began a "sweeping" 
operation in which those traveling through Muslim neighborhoods were inspected for 
identity cards (Kartu Tanda Penduduk, or KTP) or other indications of their religion. 
Some Protestants were pulled from vehicles and publicly slashed to death. Muslim 
groups also began sewing and wearing white headbands to recognize each other.
Six hundred army personnel were sent from Makassar by the Wirabuana Military 
Command but, within days, thirty-eight Protestants were reported injured and seven 
killed.67 Almost seven hundred houses belonging to Protestants and Catholics were 
destroyed, along with four Protestant church buildings, three Protestant schools, and 
one police dormitory. Reportedly, Christians did not do much to fight back, but rather 
fled their newly rebuilt homes because they still were terrorized by the events of
64 WALHI-Sulteng (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia-Sulawesi Tengah) emergency team, unpublished 
report on the Poso riots, circulated August 2000; also, "Situasi Poso," Eskol-Net, April 18,2000.
65 WALHI-Sulteng, unpublished report, and David Rohde, unpublished manuscript dated October 30,2000.
66 These Muslim coastal areas included Parigi, Tokorondo, Ampana, and Uekuli; "Situasi Poso," Eskol-Net, 
April 18,2000; WALHI-Sulteng, unpublished report.
67 "Poso Crippled as Unrest Continues Despite Deployment of More Troops," Jakarta Post, April 19,2000.
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1998.68 vvhen Governor Paliudju met with Poso police, religious leaders, and Regent 
Pusadan, he announced he would set aside money for refugees, but he warned the 
mainly Protestants victims of the riots not to take revenge because it would only 
worsen the situation.68 9 In a comment designed to prevent vendettas against Poso 
Muslims and yet resonate with local Protestant theology, Paliudju said "Let it be God 
alone who avenges their [the attackers'] actions" (Biarlah Tuhan yang membalas 
perbuatan mereka). Seemingly, God alone was being asked to investigate and punish the 
attackers because only twenty-one witnesses were questioned and, as in Phase One, 
few suspects were taken into custody. With no significant investigations pending, 
Phase Two was declared officially over by Central Sulawesi police on May 3, just three 
weeks before the start of Phase Three.70
Phase Three
The devastating Third Phase began on May 23, 2000 and continued actively 
through July 2000. An estimated three hundred to eight hundred people were killed, 
this time mostly Muslims. Thousands more homes, also owned mostly by Muslims, 
were destroyed. The flight of refugees nearly emptied the city and surrounding towns 
while it further burdened refugee destinations such as Palu, Parigi, Tentena, Napu, and 
Manado. Burned and decapitated corpses floated down the Poso River for weeks; 
more were discovered in ravines and mass graves.
Phase Three was seen by many Christians as retribution for home, church, and 
personal attacks that had been staged by Muslims for one and a half years with 
impunity. A nighttime strike was planned against the Kayamanya neighborhood by 
about a dozen black-clad "ninjas."71 Their targets were Muslims they held responsible 
for the violence of Phase Two. Most news reports assign leadership of the ninja strike 
to Fabianus Tibo, but Lateka also was named in Poso as the leader of the nighttime 
strike.72 Lateka was the Protestant Pamona civil servant who reportedly wrote the 
May 24, 1999 letter to the governor claiming that the Muslim regent, Arief Patanga 
(rather than Lateka's jailed in-law, Parimo) was responsible for inciting the first Poso 
rioting. In any case, the masked ninjas apparently ran into a policeman before reaching 
their target. In the ensuing scuffle, the gang killed three Muslims, including a police 
officer named Kamaruddin. They injured several others, and then hid inside a 
dormitory of the Santa Theresia Catholic Church at nearby Moengko. This church was 
attended mainly by ethnic Chinese and Minahasans, but also by migrants from Flores.
Fabianus (a.k.a. Cornelius) Tibo was bom circa 1945 in Flores, moved as a teenager 
to Maluku, and then became a longshoreman in Banggai, where he married and had 
three children. Afterwards he migrated to the Poso region to work on a palm oil
68 "p c i Asks Govt to Act on Poso Rioting," Jakarta Post, April 24, 2000; "Situasi Poso," Eskol-Net April 18, 
2000.
69 "Kerusuhan Poso Rumah Penduduk Mulai Dijarah," Kompas, April 19,2000.
70 Lukmanul Hakim, "Kapolda Sulteng: Kerugian Kerusuhan Poso Rp. 10 M," Detikcom, May 3,2000.
71 On the phenomenon of Javanese "ninja" killers, see James T. Siegel, "Suharto, Witches," Indonesia 71 
(April 2001): 27-78.
72 David Rohde, personal communication, March 13,2001.
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plantation. In 1978, he entered the transmigration settlement in Beteleme (then in Poso 
Regency, now in Morowali Regency), where he worked on a rubber plantation. Tibo is 
widely characterized in news reports as a recidivist criminal (residivis)—he was jailed 
from 1990-1995 for killing a man in Beteleme—or even a mercenary killer. As a 
Catholic outsider, he might have been hired to kill either Protestants or Muslims. Tibo, 
however, claimed he came to the Moengko church with other concerned Flores citizens 
because of news that all Poso churches were on the verge of attack. Tibo already knew 
the church's pastor and several ethnic Flores congregation members. The fact that 
witnesses described Tibo's followers as clothed in black, however, suggests their 
arrival in the area was more than a concerned social visit.
Authorities arrived at the church looking for the reported ninjas, disarmed the 
Christians, and negotiated with Tibo to bring them to the police station for questioning. 
When Muslim crowds threatened to ignore the police and lynch the gang, however, the 
Christian attackers fled along with frightened church staff out the back of the church. 
All but a few of the group escaped, and the church was burned down. Some say the 
arson took place as the Muslims tried to seize the Christian gang; others say it 
happened after the escape, as a response by the frustrated crowd. In any case, more 
fighting between Protestant and Muslim groups elsewhere in Poso city began the same 
day.73
The next day, Governor Paliudju announced that everything in Poso was under 
control and that three of the estimated thirteen provocateurs had been caught. Paliudju 
seemed confident that everything could be blamed on the "ninja" gang of "outsiders," 
led by Tibo, and that the criminals who escaped would be captured soon. The 
governor added that the disturbances likely were timed to draw attention away from 
the upcoming national Qur'an recital competition in Palu.74 The construction of 
buildings and preparation of roads for the competition had drawn extraordinary 
national funding to Palu. The national media attention to Palu and influx of money for 
infrastructural improvements made the event a source of pride and interest among 
Muslims and Protestants in the provincial capital—although both religious 
communities also became apprehensive about the possibility that religious attacks 
might occur during the event, which drew many "outsiders."
Tibo and Lateka were not arrested quickly, however. Another church was burned, 
and more skirmishes occurred between Christian "red troops" (pasukan merah) and 
Muslim "white troops" (pasukan putih). The different Christian attack squads became 
known as "red bats" (kelelawar merah), black bats (kelelawar hitam), and "masks" 
(topeng). As the fighting continued over the next few days, more neighborhoods were 
burned, cacao farms were attacked with chain saws, rumors spread that the public 
drinking water had been poisoned, and the number of refugees increased.
The most infamous attack on Muslims began on May 28. Tibo and his group, which 
included two other Flores Catholics without criminal records named Dominggus da 
Silva Soares and Don Marinus Riwu, surrounded Sintuwu Lemba village just south of
73 WALHI-Sulteng, unpublished report; also, compare Rita Uli H., "Poso Masih Mengkhwatirkan," 
Detikcom, May 25, 2000, with "Kronologi Kerusahan Terakhir (23 Mei-6 Juni)," Tempo, June 12-18, 2000.
74 "Poso Rusuh Lagi Tiga Tewas," jawa Post, May 24,2000; A. Era, "3 Orang Tertangkap Pasukan Ninja 
Beraksi di Poso," Detikcom, May 24, 2000.
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Poso. The area is known more generally by its location as Kilo Nine (Kilo Sembilan). 
This Javanese transmigration settlement of prospering cacao farmers was a focus of 
jealousy for the neighboring Protestant Pamona villagers of Tagolu who had watched 
their ancestral holdings shrink as the migrants continued to purchase more land. When 
Tibo's group attacked, women and children fled into the forest but many were soon 
captured and held hostage. About seventy of the village men ran and hid in a nearby 
Muslim boarding school, Pesantren Wali Songo. Tibo's group discovered the men, Tibo 
was injured in a scuffle, and his followers retaliated by executing those who 
surrendered. Some of the Muslims escaped, but Tibo's group sent out raiding parties, 
which brought some captives back to the Tagolu community hall for torture, and killed 
and tossed others directly into the Poso River.75 The captured Javanese women and 
children were not killed, but were held by Tibo's group for several days at a house in 
Tamboro Village, just south of Sintuwu Lemba. One of the women later testified that 
some were subjected to strip searches and inspections of their vaginas by Dominggus, 
who claimed to search for hidden Javanese amulets.76
In the days following the Kilo Nine atrocities, more Muslim settlements around 
Poso were attacked, and Governor Paliudju publicly named Lateka as the 
"intellectual" responsible for the Third Phase violence. Newspapers reported that 
Lateka had claimed responsibility by telephone, saying he financed the anti-Muslim 
revenge with 30 million rupiah.77 Gn June 2, 2000, hundreds of Pamona Protestants 
again fought with Muslims in the Poso neighborhood of Kayamanya, and Lateka was 
shot and killed.78 The bodies of Lateka and a Protestant woman named Paulina Dai 
were delivered to the house of a Muslim Al-Khaira'at leader.79 GKST Protestant 
leaders later claimed Lateka's body was chopped into small pieces. In the following 
days, dozens of predominantly Muslim villages along the road running west towards 
Parigi and Palu, as well as the road running east to Ampana, were attacked and 
burned, effectively closing Poso's major transportation and communication system.80 
Down the southern road, at Tentena, Muslim stores and homes also were attacked.
Once news of the Muslim deaths and floating corpses spread, the Central Sulawesi 
Student Militia (Laskar Mahasiswa Sulteng), consisting mainly of Muhammadiyah and 
Al-khaira'at pupils, demanded that the governor stop the "attacks on Muslims." 
Muslim refugees complained that police did not even appear at the sites of ongoing
75 David Rohde, unpublished manuscript; Reen et al., "Crisis in Poso"; Poso Menangis, Ratusan Nyawa 
Melayang di Pesantren Wali Songo," Kompas, June 13,2000; Lindsay Murdoch, "Religious Killing Fields 
Spread across the Ugly New Indonesia," Sydney Morning Herald, June 29, 2000.
76 "Kesaksian Empat Janda, 10 Hari Ditawan di Hutan," Al Bunyan, September 26, 2000; "Poso Massacre 
Witness Slaps Suspects in Court," Indonesian Observer, February 6,2001. On magical power (Hunt) used in 
the Poso conflicts, see Lorraine V. Aragon, "Missions and Omissions of the Supernatural," paper for the 
American Anthropological Association, December 2,2001, Washington, DC.
77 Tempo Interaktif, May 30, 2000; "Dalangnya Bemama A. L. Lateka?," jaw a Pos, May 30, 2000.
78 "Kerusuhan Poso Pecah Lagi Jumat Pagi, Dua Tewas," Suara Pembaruan, June 2,2000.
79 Habib Saleh Al Idrus (Pemimpin Majelis Zikir Nurkhaerat Poso), "Benteng Muslim Sudah Saya 
Dirikan," Formasi No. 50, August 2000, p. 6; Anton Bahtiar Rifa'i, Mustopa, and Aldrin Kd., "Kota Mati 
yang Terkepung," Forum Keadilan 11, June 18,2000, p. 88.
80 A. Era, "Polisi Tembus Barikade Warga, Situasi Poso Berangsur Pulih," Detikcom, June 5,2000.
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vandalism.81 The governor then asked Jakarta for more army assistance. Fifteen 
hundred soldiers, ten tanks, and a combat unit were sent from the Wirabuana Military 
Command in Makassar.82
Additional Muslim pressure came from the Indonesian Muslim University in 
Makassar, where students began a "sweeping" operation in the city, checking identity 
cards and beating non-Muslim passersby. The students claimed they were 
demonstrating solidarity with Poso Muslims. They also expressed their frustration 
with the Wirabuana Commander who would not meet and hear their demands.83 A 
South Sulawesi member of the Council of Indonesian Muslim Leaders (Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia, or MUI), K. H. Habib Sanggah, called for wealthy individuals "to fund the 
Muslim side" because the army and local police were doing nothing to assist them.
During June, there was continued Muslim outrage and suspicion cast upon a 
dazzling array of culprits. Suspects implicated through news media included the entire 
Poso security "apparatus," the wife of a Jakarta conglomerate leader (isteri konglomerat 
di Jakarta) who purportedly had assisted the now-slain Lateka to obtain weapons, 
Indonesian Army personnel (TNI) who had smuggled weapons, and even a German 
tourist traveling in South Sulawesi84 Despite the widespread allegations that military 
issue or imported weapons had been involved in Phase Three, there remains little 
evidence that anything beyond homemade knives, bombs, and guns—some designed to 
look, but not function, like commercial automatic weapons—were used. Many of the 
killing and "torture devices" of Poso are items otherwise used for non-aggressive, if 
ecologically unsound and dangerous, subsistence activities. For instance, bottle bombs 
made from urea fertilizer and match heads have been used illegally for decades to 
increase fish catches along Sulawesi's coasts. The cottage industry producing these 
bombs, however, much of it based in Buton Regency, has increased exponentially with 
demand from the Poso and Ambon conflicts.85
On June 6, a Christian "red group" battled with police just east of Poso, and over 
sixty more people were killed. The next day local police captured nine unnamed 
"provocateurs" and advised citizens to ignore rumors and leave everything to the 
security forces.86 As late as July, Muslims still were disappearing, more bodies were 
discovered in mass graves, and a few army men were interrogated. The Council of
81 "Poso Dalam Patawan: Mahasiswa Tuntut Diberlakukan DOM," Tempo Interaktif, May 31,2000.
82 "Kodam Kirim 1500 Tentara ke Poso, Detikcom, May 30,2000.
83 Aulia Andri Swastika and Lyndal Meehan, "Makassar Students 'Sweep' for ID Cards," Detikworld, 
June 1,2000.
84 Literally, aparat di Korem, Komando Resort Militer, Kodim, Komando Distrik Militer, serta Polres, Polisi 
Resort; see "Kerusuhan di Poso," Suara Merdeka, June 5,2000; Esther Permatasari, "Penyelundupan Senjata 
ke Poso Sudah Lama Diketahui," Detikcom, June 9,2000; "Kerusuhan di Poso Isteri Konglomerat Diduga 
Pasok Dana," Suara Merdeka, June 5,2000; Budi, Setiawan, and Muhammad, "Tragedi Poso"; "Kodam 
Wirabuana Tangkap Provokator Asing di Palopo," Jawa Pos, June 12, 2000; Iwan Triono, "Reiche Bukan 
Provokator Poso," Detikcom, June 19, 2000.
85 Arif Zulkifli, Dedy Kumiawan, and Darlis Muhammed, "Bombs from a Faraway Island," Tempo 
Interaktif, August 21-27, 2001.
86 A. Era, "Di Poso, Kelompok Merah Baku Tembak dengan Aparat," Detikcom, June 6,2000; Lukmanul 
Hakim, "Kerusuhan Poso, Polisi Tangkap 9 Provokator," Detikcom, June 7,2000; "Kronologi Kerusuhan 
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Indonesian Muslim Leaders scolded the police for their inability to catch Christian 
gang leaders.87 In mid-July, 124 people suspected of involvement in the Christian "red 
group" were arrested well southeast of Poso in the Kolonedale area of Morowali 
Regency.88 Then, on July 25, Tibo was found hiding in the same area; he was captured 
and sent to jail in Palu.89
Other "red group" members captured and investigated by police included 
Dominggus da Silva Soares, Don Marinus Riwu (also referred to as Martianus or 
Rinus), Fery (also referred to as Hery), Leonardus, Alexius, and Rahman, mostly other 
ethnic Flores Catholics who resided at or near Beteleme, Morowali Regency.90 
Witnesses claimed to have observed these individuals slaughtering Muslim victims. 
According to later trial witnesses, Tibo had prepared a seven-hundred-man militia 
over the course of a month at a training camp at Kelei Village (near to Tentena in the 
Pamona Utara District), and the training was funded by retired army officers, or other 
outsiders.91 Tibo initially confessed that he personally executed about forty of the 
hundreds who were thrown into the Poso River or other mass graves, but later 
retracted this admission. Flis lawyer claimed Tibo was less important than four or five 
other leaders or "generals" (jenderal).92 Witnesses to this statement explained that, 
when Tibo's lawyer mentioned "generals," he and Tibo, whom he represented, were 
speaking metaphorically of Protestant Poso leaders such as Lateka, but many 
newspaper readers assumed they were referring to "red" or anti-Muslim army generals 
in Jakarta. Moreover, the Indonesian media focus on "provocateurs," "intellectuals," 
"ninjas," and "masses," (provokator, intelektual, ninja, massa) obfuscated the power 
struggles, patron-client economic links, and concepts of identity operating in Sulawesi 
at the kinship, village, and religious congregation level.
Attempted Reconciliation, the Tibo Trial, and the Onset of Phase Four
In August 2000, the governors of Central, North, and South Sulawesi met in 
Tentena to sign a "peace accord" aimed at reassuring refugees that they could return 
home safely and would receive some government aid.93 Yet, ministers from the Central 
Sulawesi Protestant Church (GKST) and related Crisis Center in Tentena, as well as 
Javanese Muslims who had fled to South Sulawesi, felt uninvolved and unconvinced. 
On August 22, President Wahid himself attended a peace meeting with invited Poso 
leaders. This neo-traditional adat ritual, complete with the burial of a buffalo head,
87 "Tiga Anggota TNI Asal Kodim Poso Ditahan Polisi Militer," Kompas, July 5,2000; "Ulama Sesalkan 
Polisi Lambat Tangkap Perusuh di Poso," Kompas, July 6,2000; "211 Confirmed Dead in Poso Clashes," 
Jakarta Post, July 6, 2000.
88 "124 Arrested over Latest Poso Violence," Jakarta Post, July 10,2000.
89 "Panglima Perang Poso Ditangkap," Kompas, July 27,2000.
90 "Tokoh Perusuh di Poso Terancam Pidana Mati," Analisa, August 4,2000; "Three More Arrested over 
Poso Killings," Jakarta Post, August 16,2000.
91 "Poso Rioters Got Supply of Guns," Jakarta Post, January 30,2001.
92 "Witnesses Testify about Massacre in Poso," Jakarta Post, February 6, 2001; "Palu," Tempo, July 6 
August 2000, p. 37; "Tibo Ungkap Lima Jenderal Tertingginya," Mercusuar, July 29,2000, p. 1.
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reportedly signified the leaders' resolve to end their animosities.94 The ceremony was 
described with a Pamona phrase, Sintuwu Maroso, which translates as "Strong When 
United" or "Strong Union." This phrase is the official slogan of the Pamona Utara 
district, although its widespread use in government signs now seems incongruous given 
the bloody fighting in the region. The term originally implied ongoing economic 
exchange, somewhat comparable to gotong royong in Java. Ironically, one of the 
structural problems of the Poso area—and probably several other communal conflict 
regions—is that lowlanders (Muslims) and highlanders (Protestants) no longer 
symbiotically exchange coastal and forest products as they once did. Instead, they too 
often compete head-on for access to the same road-side land, cash-crop sales, and 
central government development funds, a by-product of Indonesia's historical 
experience of nationalization and globalization. Comparable to many others involved 
in contemporary ethnonationalist conflicts, Poso Protestants and Muslims increasingly 
have "forgotten" the positive aspects of their shared historical and cultural bonds, 
while their recent experience of injury promotes the systematic creation of hatred and 
revives animosities from the 1950s rebellions.95
Despite several high-profile reconciliation efforts in late 2000, public criticisms 
continued about biased processes of investigation, recurring incidents of Poso violence, 
and dwindling food supplies in the Palu and other refugee camps, from which tens of 
thousands of residents understandably were reluctant to depart. Although the 
Indonesian Red Cross chairman urged administrators not to segregate refugees along 
religious lines, de facto segregation occurred in the camps, and most Christians and 
Muslims fled to towns where their own religion was in the majority.96 The refugee 
camps and resettlement process contributed not only to Indonesia's "domestic 
conflict" economic problems, but also to the nation's increasing "ghetto-ization" of 
religious communities.
As Poso burned and refugees poured in, Palu remained calm, if tense, throughout 
the summer of 2000. Most Muslim and Protestant leaders in Palu called for peace and 
restraint. They also made efforts to assist the ten thousand to twenty thousand 
refugees who amassed in Palu's Gawalise sports stadium and in the barracks for non­
permanent civil servants from Poso (Mess Pemda Poso).97 By October, however, Muslim 
groups began demonstrating in Palu, demanding that Tibo quickly be tried and 
executed.
The trial of Fabianus Tibo and two of his accomplices, Dominggus Soares Da Silva, 
and Don Marinus Riwu, ran from December 2000 to April 2001. Provincial Muslim 
leaders and Palu protesters clamored for their execution, while Protestant leaders 
argued that justice would only be complete if perpetrators of the First and Second
94 "Warga Poso Sepakat Damai," Kompas, August 23,2000; "Poso Leaders Bury Hatchets for Peace Before 
Gus Dur," Jakarta Post, August 23,2000.
95 Das, "Specificities: Official Narratives," pp. 113-114.
96 "Don't Separate Poso Refugees: Mar'ie," Jakarta Post, June 26,2000; "Over 20,000 Refugees Afraid to Go 
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Phases of the conflict also were prosecuted.98 Only the trial of Tibo and accomplices 
moved forward, with prosecutors demanding the death penalty. By January 2001, 
continuous sporadic violence in the Poso Regency not only was noticeable, but seemed 
to worsen. Households and religious buildings were attacked, small bombs exploded, 
suspected bombers were assailed, and police posts were targeted as the Tibo trial 
concluded.99
The trial itself was a dramatic affair with witnesses for the prosecution claiming 
that helicopters supplied Tibo's training camp with M-16 rifles from Manado and gyms 
made in the Philippines. A Javanese woman who was held hostage after the raid at 
Sintuwu Lemba (Kilo Nine) suddenly slapped the faces of the defendants before telling 
her story of the vaginal inspection. The reigning Poso regent, Muin Pusadan, came to 
testify, and he laid the blame squarely on the backs of Tibo and the slain Lateka. The 
three defendants denied all the main charges and stated that prosecution witnesses 
were lying. Enraged and grief-stricken Muslim men and women threatened the 
defendants and their police escorts on the way to and from the Palu courtroom.100
On April 5, 2001, Judge Soedarmo convicted all three defendants of premeditated 
murders on three separate dates at three separate locations.101 The judge considered 
the defendants to be without remorse and imposed the death penalty, further exciting 
the court audience. During the hearings, Tibo reportedly named sixteen other persons 
responsible for the violence. Among those named were two Protestant officials living in 
Palu. One was Yahya Patiro, the failed candidate for regent who was exonerated and 
later became a gubernatorial assistant administrator (Asistan Administrasi Gubernor). 
The other was Edi Bungkundapu, secretary at the DPRD I. Both denied wrongdoing, 
and Bungkundapu claimed simply that his political enemies were trying to ruin him. 
Patiro's home in Palu was stormed by angry Muslims, but the owners already had fled, 
reportedly to the airport.102
Some news reports noted that the trial of Tibo and company was unprecedented, 
being the first time a court passed a death sentence on persons involved in any of 
Indonesia's recent riots.103 This implied that the state had partially achieved long- 
sought control over ethnoreligious violence, one of Indonesia's many recent forms of 
unacceptable disorder. Yet, as Protestant leaders were quick to point out, no Muslim
98 "Death Penalty Demanded for Poso Riot Suspects," Jakarta Post, December 11,2000; "Christian Youth 
Group Pleas for Law and Order/' Indonesian Observer, October 28, 2000.
99 "Tension Escalates in Poso," Jakarta Post, January 18, 2001; "Provocateurs Play with Fire in Poso 
Conflict," Indonesian Observer, January 26, 2001; "Armed Mobs Renew Attacks at a Police Post in Poso," 
Jakarta Post, April 6, 2001; "Poso Remains Tense, Buildings Ablaze," Jakarta Post, April 10, 2001.
100 "poso Rioters Got Supply of Guns," Jakarta Post, January 30, 2001; "Poso Massacre Witness Slaps 
Suspects in Court," Indonesian Observer, February 6, 2001; "Widows Vent Anger against Defendants," 
Jakarta Post, April 12, 2001; "Bupati Poso Tampil Sebagai Saksi," Tempo Interaktif, February 12, 2001.
These were: Poso city on May 23, 2000; Sintuwu Lemba, Lage District, on May 28, 2000; and another 
nearby village in Lage District on May 30, 2000; "Poso Riot Leaders Given Death Sentence," Jakarta Post, 
April 6, 2001.
102 Arifin A., "Febianus [sic] Tibo Dihukum Mati," Detikcom, April 5, 2001; "Three Men Get Death for 
Plotting Poso Violence," Jakarta Post, April 6,2001; "Rumah Pejabat Gubernor Sulteng Diserbu Massa," 
Gatra, April 5, 2001; "Poso Remains Tense, Buildings Ablaze," Jakarta Post, April 10, 2001.
103 "Widows Vent Anger against Defendants," Jakarta Post, April 12, 2001.
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killers were tried or sentenced, implying that the state was not yet able to provide 
justice and security to all. Moreover, any hopes for peace and reconciliation in Poso 
following Tibo's conviction were fleeting. Within days, there were new group attacks 
on Poso mosques, on an Al-Khaira'at school, on Muslim residents of the Kayamanya 
neighborhood, and on cacao groves in Muslim villages just south of Poso city.104 By 
late June and early July 2001, there were frequent reports about both Protestant and 
Muslim villages being attacked, and thousands more fleeing (or again fleeing) the Poso 
Regency. The term Phase Four increasingly was applied to these now familiar, civil war 
conditions.105
Phase Four reports indicate that the conflict continues on the same ethnic and 
economic fronts as earlier: first, between mostly Pamona Protestants and mostly Bugis 
Muslims of Poso City; second, in the cacao groves of rural villages to the south, the 
places where Javanese and other Muslim migrants have encroached on what many 
Pamona Protestants still view as their ancestral lands. As in the earlier phases, the 
Poso police, Brimob from Palu, and TNI units from Makassar have shot or captured a 
few perpetrators of the attacks, but these forces are unable to stop the violence or earn 
local residents' confidence that the security forces are neutral parties. And, once again, 
regency and provincial political posts are part of the dispute. DPRD II leaders from 
three factions have asked Regent Muin Pusadan and the new Muslim governor, 
Aminuddin Ponulele, to resign because of their inability to curb the violence. The same 
(unidentified) legislators also claimed that Pusadan and Ponulele had transgressed 
popular (clearly Christian) requests when they appointed the Muslim Awad Al-Amri 
as the newest in a revolving line of regency secretaries.106 These demands seemingly ask 
for a return to the pre-1999 situation, when a Pamona Protestant, Patiro, was given 
the number-two post as regional secretary, although the regent position itself was 
awarded to a Muslim, Arief Patanga. Other recent reports, which also promise little 
hope for reconciliation, include news of attempted weapons smuggling to Central 
Sulawesi, and a Laskar Jihad team's July reconnaissance visit to Palu and Poso. The 
Laskar Jihad team met with Tadulako University professors, Governor Ponulele, Poso 
regent Muin Pusadan, and representatives of MUI and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah 
Indonesia (DDII, or Indonesian Council for Islamic Appeals).107
Religious Reasoning about the Violence
Questions remain about how religious ideology is used to interpret and justify 
communal violence in Central Sulawesi and elsewhere. How is religion uniting some 
and dividing other Indonesians in a way that makes killing acceptable? Clearly, 
confidence in God's support is used to justify otherwise unconscionable actions. But,
104 Johan Budi S. P. and Regional Contributors (Darlis Muhamed), "Poso: Fanning Suffering's Flames," 
Tempo, June 26-July 2, 2001.
105 Bina Bektiati, Darlis Muhamed, "Poso Riots Part IV: Poso on the Edge," Tempo, July 10-16, 2001; Crisis 
Centre GKST (Central Sulawesi Protestant Church Crisis Centre), "Laporan Situasi Poso (2-4 Juli 2001)," 
Eskol-Net, July 7, 2001; "Gelombang Pengungsi Kembali Mengalir ke Palu," Kompas, July 6,2001.
106 "p0iice Troops Shoot Dead Five Attackers in Poso," Jakarta Post, July 6, 2001.
107 "Gun Smuggling Attempt Foiled," Jakarta Post, August 2,2001; "Laskar Jihad Datang, Kristen Resah," 
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how are religious leaders and lay people using scriptural teachings and organizational 
networks to make sense of the violence? And, how do victims use territorial images to 
categorize their religious enemies?
In Palu, I spoke with a Muslim refugee family of mixed Bugis and Makasar ancestry 
who had fled in June 2000 from the village of Tokorondo, northwest of Poso. They had 
immigrated from South Sulawesi only six years previously when the father was hired 
to work in the local timber industry. They joined a South Sulawesi immigrant faction 
within an old Protestant Pamona village. Family members were harvesting cacao when 
they were forced to evacuate immediately. They said that, by the time they fled their 
village, they no longer knew who were their friends and who were their enemies (siapa 
yang kaxvan, siapa yang lawan), meaning that some of their formerly amiable Protestant 
neighbors suddenly were burning their houses. They said they now had no reason to 
return to Poso. They had heard from Bugis refugees who arrived later that their home 
had been burned to the ground and their cacao trees were all picked. They had heard, 
and now believed, that Christian mercenaries such as Tibo had been paid a large fee 
for every Muslim they butchered. They could not (or perhaps would not) say who 
might have paid such as fee.
In August 2000, the pro-Muslim tabloid Formasi, published in Palu, ran an entire 
issue portraying the Poso violence as a "scenario of religious coercion" (skenario 
pemaksaan agama). Muslim leaders interviewed in the tabloid insisted that local 
Protestants and foreign missionaries were aggressively seeking converts from the 
Muslim population, using force and terror tactics where necessary.108 Muslim refugees I 
met from Poso, as well as some vocal Muslim leaders, accused Central Sulawesi church 
leaders of direct involvement in the violence. Many also spoke of national or even 
international (especially American) "efforts to eliminate the Muslim community from 
the Poso area" (upaya melenyapkan unimat Islam dari bumi Poso).109
I spoke with a Chinese Catholic woman from Poso City whose mother's home been 
burned down twice, once during Phase One in December 1998, then again in Phase 
Two in April 2000. After hiding in the hills above Poso and watching Muslim groups 
burn her home for a second time, the mother fled to her sister's house in North 
Sulawesi. She reached her destination safely, but the Protestant Toraja man who drove 
her there later was lynched during a "sweeping" incident, his stomach cut out while 
angry Muslims burned his car. After that, the mother decided she never would return 
to Poso. When I asked if her mother recognized the Muslims who burned her house, the 
woman replied that her mother never used personal names, but always identified the 
attackers according to their Muslim neighborhood (kelurahan), as in the form, orang 
Kayamanya. Neighborhoods thus became coded by their primary religious affiliations 
as part of the ongoing process of religious territorialization.
108 Formasi, No. 50, August 2000; see especially Hadi, Djamaluddin, "Pemaksaan Agama Adalah Kejahatan 
HAM," p. 4; and Warn, Darwis, and Zainul Hikam, "Bayang-bayang Missionaris dalam Poso Berdarah," 
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109 Haryono, Munanshar, and Pambudi, "Jejak Kelalawar Hitam, Pembantai Muslim Poso," Majalah Suara 
Hidayatullah, July 2000; also, "Laporan Telpon Poso, Sulteng," Media.isnet.org from 
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Many Central Sulawesi Protestants explained the anti-Muslim vengeance in Phase 
Three in these biblical terms: Poso Protestants had turned their cheeks twice (in Phases 
One and Two), but then had no more cheeks left to turn. Some Muslim leaders also 
analyzed the issue of retaliation in scriptural terms. H. S. Saggaf Aljufri, a leader of the 
region's Al-Khaira'at organization and regional chair of the Council of Indonesian 
Muslim Leaders, agreed that Poso Muslims had reacted too harshly during Phase Two. 
He said that Islam permits striking back once for every blow received, but Poso 
Muslims had struck back three or four times as hard when they attacked and burned 
Christian neighborhoods.110 Such expressions of regret, acceptance of responsibility, or 
arguments for moderation have been rare among Poso's religious leaders from either 
side.
Many Central Sulawesi Muslims and Christians remained baffled by the Poso 
events, and assumed that only the unfathomable wickedness of criminals such as Tibo 
could explain the violence. Some Protestants told me that Tibo could not really be a 
Christian if he were able to commit the acts of which he was accused.111 Other 
Protestants, however, saw in the peculiar sequence of events a kind of Old Testament- 
style annihilation of oppressors. Several individuals showed me Old Testament verses 
in which God decided that one group or individual deserved blessings or victory and 
another did not. They considered these scriptural situations to be analogous to the 
recent, local conflicts that secured the Protestant "victory" over Muslims in Phase 
Three.
The view that it was God who decreed victory and defeat, however, offended 
other Protestants when it was invoked to explain the Muslim "victories" of Phases 
One and Two. One Central Sulawesi Protestant Church (GKST) leader was offended 
because he understood Governor Paliudju's April 18, 2000 statement to imply that 
Phase One and Two damages against Christians were wrought by God and so should 
not be avenged by human beings.112 In that case, the Protestant minister was outraged 
that a Muslim politician would insinuate that God's rules were prevailing among 
mankind during the communal conflicts. On the other hand, rather than distancing 
themselves from all acts of violence, the same ministers from the GKST synod in 
Tentena seemingly defended local Protestants involved in heinous Third Phase attacks 
on Muslims, such as the one at Kilo Nine.113 *The Toba Batak director of the GKST 
Crisis Center in Tentena wrote that efforts were being made to scapegoat and label as 
rioters "Poso citizens who only struggled to seek justice in their ancestral land" 
(anggota masyarakat Tana Poso yang berjuang mengupayakan keadilan di tanah 
leluhurnya).lu
Although the religious focus on Holy Wars and Acts of God, like the media focus 
on headhunters and criminal provocateurs, eclipses group conflicts over resources, it is 
clear that access to land will be gained or lost by particular ethnic groups in regional
110 Reen et al., "Crisis in Poso."
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conflicts such as Poso's. Hence, the use of terror tactics and gruesome imagery by both 
Central Sulawesi citizens and government forces becomes potentially strategic: to 
trigger refugee flight or justify military intervention. Most Protestant refugees escaped 
to more securely Protestant areas, such as Tentena, Napu, or Manado, while most 
Muslim refugees fled to more securely Muslim areas such as Palu, Parigi, South 
Sulawesi, and Java. Thus, while such violence may look and feel like an expressive 
manifestation of anger or a millennial moment defining God's will, no one should 
overlook its territorial and relational causes as well as consequences.115
To add further on the question of why western Central Sulawesi Protestants and 
Muslims were better able to contain provocations and maintain peace, it is useful to 
compare Salvation Army leaders' pronouncements to those of GKST leaders in Poso. 
Most Salvation Army leaders continued their usual declarations that "People make 
plans, but it is God who arranges everything" (Manusia berencana tetapi Tuhan yang 
mengatur semua), "everything is in God's hands" (semua di dalam tangan Tuhan), and 
"we humans must just pray" (kita manusia harus berdoa saja). These phrases encourage 
congregations not to interfere with unfortunate events other than to pray. This 
fatalistic attitude, combined with interdenominational Protestant rivalries and few 
kinship relations with Pamona people, prevented most Palu area Protestants from 
viewing attacks against Poso Protestants as actions they should avenge personally. In 
short, while Protestant churches worked to unite community groups within a single 
mission field, sectarian competition created geographic boundaries that divided those 
religious unions from one another. It is also interesting to note that some Hindu 
Balinese migrant enclaves situated in the midst of devastated Muslim and Protestant 
areas around Poso remained unharmed, demonstrating the precision of the Muslim and 
Protestant assaults with regard to their ethnic and religious targets.116
Although criticized by some observers for thinking too exclusively about their own 
membership, by July 2000, Salvation Army congregations in Palu were collecting rice 
donations for Poso refugees without regard to religious affiliation. In another measure 
showing belated concern about their image with local Muslims, Salvation Army leaders 
temporarily halted construction on half-built churches in Palu, saying that it would be 
improper to continue such projects while refugees were suffering. More conciliatory 
efforts by Christian and Muslim groups throughout Sulawesi will be needed to stop the 
settling of old scores and begin the remembering of common needs.
Patron-Client Ties, Struggling Regions, and the Need for a Renewed State
There are several lessons from Sulawesi history that can be recast to aid 
understanding of the Poso conflicts. First, we should consider the relevance of the 
historical tension between territorial and human ("ethnic" and "religious") bases of 
political geography that has been observed since the colonial era. Ethnic identity 
among indigenous Central Sulawesi groups is strongly landmark based, which is why
115 Danilyn Rutherford, "Waiting for the End in Biak: Violence, Order, and a Flag Raising," Indonesia 67 
(1999): 39-59; and Nils Bubandt, "Violence and Doom: Cultural Narratives and the Dynamics of Violence 
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Pamona and other autochthonous highlanders are concerned over alienation from their 
ancestral land, which has been increasingly occupied by immigrants from the South 
Sulawesi and Javanese diasporas. Second, the basis of leaders' authority always has 
been communal, rather than territorially, bounded, which is why Pamona leaders in 
Poso could readily mobilize fellow GKST members in Tentena, and why similar 
networks, such as Al-Khaira'at, were mobilized in coastal Muslim communities east 
and west of Poso. As discussed earlier, these religious divisions were strengthened by 
the intentional or unintentional actions of the state throughout the twentieth century, 
from the Dutch colonial through the New Order administrations. Third, local leaders 
always have gained and held prestige based on their ability to broker economic deals 
with outsiders. Formerly, desirable resources for highlanders came through exchange 
with coastal kingdoms, and vice versa. Later, missionaries and religious organizations 
served to broker many economic exchanges. Now the biggest prize money comes from 
Jakarta, with some resources channeled through the provincial capital of Palu, which is 
why both Pamona and Bugis-affiliated leaders feel that they cannot lead their 
communities effectively without representation of some kind in the Poso Regency 
office.
Thus, we can reconsider the conflict phases in Poso as events involving patronage 
politics that mobilized groups who harbored pre-existing resentments about ethnic 
disparities in land and political control, and who subscribed to ideologies divided 
along twentieth-century religious currents (aliran). Phases One and Two demonstrate 
the increasingly state-supported, political strength of Bugis-affiliated Muslim migrants 
to Poso City, who were reinforced by coastal Muslims allies, as it compared to the 
declining political strength of Protestant Pamona. Christians found themselves unable 
to get their candidates elected, saw their neighborhoods burned, and were unable to 
obtain the security they sought from the police and judicial authorities. Phase Three 
represents a vendetta likely organized by urban Pamona, which was supported by the 
irredentist sentiments of their rural GKST allies as well as several Catholic immigrant 
fighters. Both patterns of attack—Muslims against Protestants and Protestants against 
Muslims—warrant more detailed analysis of the economic struggles and geographic 
networks involved.
The fighting began each time between Pamona-affiliated Protestants and Bugis- 
affiliated Muslims in Poso City. Urban violence escalated and spread as these factions 
called in their allies. Muslims came from the coastal towns to the east and west of 
Poso, and GKST Protestants came from the interior to the south towards Tentena. 
Fighting ultimately spread along the roads into the rural districts, especially just south 
of Poso, where both Javanese Muslims and Flores Catholics became involved. Beyond 
their respective Muslim or Christian ideologies, what political interests and economic 
transactions tied these different ethnic groups together?
In Poso City, Pamona and Bugis-led factions struggled for political control over the 
regency administration and the economic development perquisites which that political 
office entailed. Muslim factions won that competition, although the winning 
individuals were not the original Muslim contenders. Outside of Poso, especially to the 
south, immigrant Muslims, mainly Javanese and Bugis, increasingly competed with 
indigenous Protestant subsistence farmers to gain land for cash crops. The networks 
between the urban and rural groups were economic as well as religious. Rural Muslim
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immigrants, of mainly Javanese and South Sulawesi heritage, marketed their cash crops 
to Poso traders, such as those in Kayamanya. Kayamanya is only a few miles directly 
downstream from Sintuwu Lemba (Kilo Nine), and the patron-client connection 
between the two communities reportedly is strong. Similar exchange relations, as well 
as direct kinship ties, linked Muslim Poso neighborhoods to towns east towards 
Ampana and west towards Parigi. Among all these communities, Islamic organizations 
such as Al-Khaira'at broadened the network beyond strict relations of ethnicity.
Among Pamona and other Protestants in the towns around Poso and between 
Poso and Tentena, the connections are even more straightforward. Individuals were 
tied to an ideology of a common ancestral homeland. This nativist ideology was 
elaborated, and the human network expanded, through the GKST church organization. 
The least obvious factor is still the participation by Catholic migrants from Flores to 
the Poso-Morowali regions. Somehow Lateka (now deceased), the brother-in-law of 
Parimo (now deceased), became connected with Tibo and his accomplices. Most likely, 
money, combined with religious passion, fueled the Third Phase vendettas from which 
Poso has yet to recover. At this point, now sadly deemed Phase Four, the legacy of 
uncontained violence has fostered widespread distrust, a seductively profitable 
homemade weapons industry, and levels of local anxiety that make many people look 
outward for some hope of state relief and balanced mediation.
The 1999 Regional Autonomy Laws asserted that the rights, origins, and customary 
traditions of villages and regions are to be respected, without saying exactly how that 
is to be done in multi-ethnic areas experiencing just the opposite lessons during the 
Suharto period. The DPR's Commission on Security Affairs recently backed a plan to 
solve Poso's disturbances with a return to customary law.117 Yet, ancestral rules for 
dispute settlement can only work where the rules are consensually authorized. This is 
unlikely to be the case in Poso among Bugis, Pamona, and Javanese, among many 
others. National legal solutions also are difficult in a politically unstable nation short 
of cash and reliable systems of justice. Should the physical and political displacement 
of indigenous peoples be retroactively redressed? Should previously favored groups 
who obtained development jobs or appropriated the ancestral lands of others be 
suddenly stripped of their gains? Such cases are not easily adjudicated because 
migrating groups, such as Bugis, Javanese, Minahasans, or Madurese, often are just as 
much subjects of state development programs and elite business interests as the 
Pamona, Kaili, or Dayak whom they displace. Clearly, it is easier to recognize the 
state's historic culpability and current infrastructural problems than it is to find 
communal conflict solutions without adequate and neutral state security and justice. 
Yet, neutral security forces, grassroots bilateral mediation, and a vision of a more level 
playing field are what is needed.
In July, 2000, 1 asked several Central Sulawesi citizens what they thought when 
President Suharto stepped down. Most said they had at first been elated by the 
resignation. Then some people commented that, "for thirty-three years under Suharto, 
Indonesia was a peaceful place, but now under President Wahid there are disturbances 
everywhere." The resignation of President Suharto simultaneously removed both a 
legitimate target of popular anger and the military control mechanism that prevented
117 " d p r  Racks Plan to Use Customary Law in Poso," Jakarta Post, August 6,2001.
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expressions of, and regional solutions to, communal dissatisfaction. Indonesians came 
to distrust the legal-military bureaucracy and doubt the state's ability to create the 
security and justice needed for regional reconciliation. Vigilantism prevailed, and 
religious symbolism overshadowed more complex economic realities in places such as 
Poso, where the actions of a few political leaders or "big fish" led to severe losses for 
tens of thousands of people.

